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1277 
Marital Supremacy and the Constitution 
of the Nonmarital Family 
Serena Mayeri* 
Despite a transformative half century of social change, marital 
status still matters. The marriage equality movement has drawn 
attention to the many benefits conferred in law by marriage at a time 
when the “marriage gap” between affluent and poor Americans 
widens and rates of nonmarital childbearing soar. This Essay 
explores the contested history of marital supremacy—the legal 
privileging of marriage—through the lens of the “illegitimacy” cases 
of the 1960s and 1970s. Often remembered as a triumph for 
nonmarital families, these decisions defined the constitutional harm 
of illegitimacy classifications as the unjust punishment of innocent 
children for the “sins” of their parents. By reaffirming the legitimacy 
of governmental objectives such as discouraging illicit sex and 
promoting traditional marriage, courts obscured the ways in which 
marital supremacy injured adults as well as children, reinforcing 
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racial, gender, and economic inequality and circumscribing sexual 
and reproductive freedom. 
Using court documents and archival sources, this Essay 
uncovers alternative visions of the harm of illegitimacy penalties 
offered by advocates and activists who framed these laws and 
practices as centrally connected to poverty, systemic racial 
oppression, and the subordination of women. Civil rights and poverty 
lawyers spotlighted the disparate impact of illegitimacy penalties on 
poor families of color, especially African Americans in the South. 
Feminists emphasized how these laws disproportionately burdened 
women—who often bore primary responsibility for nonmarital 
children’s care and support—curtailing their sexual, reproductive, 
and economic freedom. The failure of these broader accounts of the 
harms of illegitimacy penalties to influence judicial opinions 
impoverished our constitutional politics in ways that reverberate 
today. In a world where marriage is both a privileged status and a 
status of the privileged, marriage equality that rests upon non-
marriage’s ignominy risks reinforcing the many other status 
inequalities that taint the legacy of marital supremacy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Despite a transformative half century of social change, marital status still 
matters. The marriage equality movement has drawn attention to the many 
benefits the law confers on married couples, from parental rights to 
immigration preferences to tax breaks and public entitlements.1 Marital 
supremacy2—the legal privileging of marriage—endures, despite soaring rates 
of nonmarital childbearing and a widening “marriage gap” that divides 
Americans by race, wealth, and education.3 The stakes of marital supremacy 
are higher than ever as marriage becomes the province of the privileged. 
Yet marital supremacy has a contested history. This Essay explores the 
surprisingly neglected story of constitutional challenges to “illegitimacy”-based 
classifications,4 and to other “illegitimacy penalties,”5 in the 1960s and 1970s. 
During this period, the Supreme Court began to apply heightened scrutiny to 
laws that discriminated against “illegitimate” children in areas such as 
wrongful death recovery, workers’ compensation, child support, inheritance, 
 
 1. On the long history of marriage’s public significance, see NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: 
A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION (2000). 
 2. In this Essay, I use the term “marital supremacy” to refer broadly to the legal privileging of 
marriage over non-marriage, and marital over nonmarital families. For other uses of the term, see, for 
example, ELIZABETH FREEMAN, THE WEDDING COMPLEX: FORMS OF BELONGING IN MODERN 
AMERICAN CULTURE (2002); ELIZABETH H. PLECK, NOT JUST ROOMMATES: COHABITATION AFTER 
THE SEXUAL REVOLUTION (2012); Serena Mayeri, The Status of Marriage: Marital Supremacy 
Challenged and Remade, 1960–2000 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 3. See, e.g., JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW INEQUALITY IS 
REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY (2014). 
 4. I use the terms “legitimate” and “illegitimate” advisedly, without wishing to endorse in 
any way their denigration of nonmarital families. Where possible, I substitute the (also imperfect) term 
“nonmarital,” but when discussing legal status, only legitimate and illegitimate accurately capture the 
categories that distinguish the treatment of (some) nonmarital children from that of other children. 
Similarly, the term “marital children” does not accurately describe all children considered legally 
legitimate, since legitimacy can result from the operation of various legal presumptions or, in recent 
times, from post hoc legal processes of legitimation. 
 5. “Illegitimacy penalties” include laws that distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate 
children (often called “illegitimacy-based classifications”) as well as other laws and practices that 
impose disadvantages on nonmarital children and their parents, such as bans on the employment of 
nonmarital parents; laws requiring unmarried mothers to disclose the identities of their children’s 
fathers; “suitable home” and substitute father laws withholding welfare benefits because of a mother’s 
nonmarital sexual relationship; and the exclusion of unmarried mothers from “mother’s insurance” 
benefits under the Social Security Act. Lawsuits challenging these illegitimacy penalties rarely appear 
on lists of the illegitimacy cases decided in the 1960s and 1970s; including them exposes the wider 
range of constitutional arguments advocates made about the consequences of marital supremacy and 
illuminates the stakes of the Court’s approach to illegitimacy. 
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and government benefits.6 These decisions followed and prompted statutory 
reforms that mitigated many of the harshest legal disabilities historically 
imposed upon nonmarital children.7 
The illegitimacy cases are often remembered as a triumph for nonmarital 
families, a long overdue recognition of children’s humanity irrespective of 
birth status.8 But these decisions hardly championed the equal status of adults 
who lived outside the bonds of marriage. The constitutional harm of 
illegitimacy classifications, according to the Justices, lay in the punishment of 
“hapless” and “innocent” children for the “sins” or “transgressions” of their 
parents.9 
The illegitimacy cases reshaped, but did not vanquish, marital supremacy. 
By focusing on the blamelessness of children, these decisions not only 
obscured the constitutional harms of illegitimacy penalties’ detrimental impact 
on adults, but also ignored how these laws reinforced broader racial, sexual, 
and socioeconomic inequities that impoverished entire families.10 The Court 
found nothing unconstitutional about discouraging illicit sex and promoting 
traditional marriage. Rather, to the extent illegitimacy classifications violated 
equal protection, their infirmity lay in the tenuous relationship between means 
(punishing innocent children) and ends (deterring adult misconduct).11 
 
 6. See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Glona v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 
391 U.S. 73 (1968); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 
417 U.S. 628 (1974); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977). 
 7. Scholars generally, and historians in particular, have paid relatively little attention to the 
illegitimacy cases. For recent exceptions in the legal literature, see Susan Frelich Appleton, 
Illegitimacy and Sex, Old and New, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 347 (2012); Martha F. 
Davis, Male Coverture: Law and the Illegitimate Family, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 73 (2003); Katie R. 
Eyer, Constitutional Crossroads and the Canon of Rational Basis Review, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 527 
(2014); Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma, and Discrimination Against 
Nonmarital Children, 63 FLA. L. REV. 345 (2011); Melissa Murray, What’s So New About the New 
Illegitimacy?, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 387 (2012); Allison Anna Tait, A Tale of Three 
Families: Historical Households, Earned Belonging, and Natural Connections, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 
1345 (2012); Deborah A. Widiss, Non-Marital Families and (or After?) Marriage Equality, 42 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 547 (2014). There is one book-length study of the cases by political scientists, which 
analyzes the decisions but does not draw upon archival sources. MARTHA T. ZINGO & KEVIN E. 
EARLY, NAMELESS PERSONS: LEGAL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST NON-MARITAL CHILDREN IN THE 
UNITED STATES (1994). 
 8. For critical perspectives, see, for example, ZINGO & EARLY, supra note 7; Davis, supra 
note 7; Murray, supra note 7; see also Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family Law: A Legal Structure 
for Nonmarital Families, 67 STAN. L. REV. 167, 167 (2015) (“In family law, the marital family serves 
as a misleading synecdoche for all families, not only marginalizing nonmarital families but also 
actively undermining their already tenuous bonds.”). 
 9. For a historical perspective on the dangers of invoking innocent children to achieve policy 
reform, see Linda Gordon, The Perils of Innocence, or What’s Wrong With Putting Children First, 1 J. 
HIST. CHILDHOOD & YOUTH 331 (2008). 
 10. See Davis, supra note 7, at 92. 
 11. Cf. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term: Foreword: In Search of Evolving 
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972) 
(observing that the Court avoided making difficult normative judgments about morals regulations by 
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But this was far from the only available account of illegitimacy 
classifications’ harms, constitutional and otherwise. Advocates initially framed 
illegitimacy penalties as centrally connected to poverty and to systemic racial 
oppression. As feminist advocacy generated new constitutional sex equality 
arguments, activists and lawyers emphasized the disproportionate burden 
illegitimacy penalties imposed on unmarried mothers who often bore sole 
responsibility for the care and support of nonmarital children. Opponents of 
illegitimacy penalties proclaimed, sometimes cautiously but occasionally 
boldly, a right to sexual freedom outside of marriage. And they questioned, 
directly and indirectly, the constitutionality of marital supremacy itself. 
Hardly a trace of these arguments about race, sex, sexual liberty, and 
economic inequality appears in the Court’s illegitimacy opinions.12 This 
erasure had profound and enduring consequences for nonmarital families—
disproportionately poor and headed by women of color—and for the 
contemporary constitutional landscape. 
This Essay recovers alternative accounts of the harms of illegitimacy 
penalties and explores why these accounts failed to infiltrate constitutional 
doctrine and disappeared from historical memory. Part I dives into early 
illegitimacy litigation, tracing race discrimination arguments against 
illegitimacy penalties through archival and other primary sources. The 
plaintiffs in these early cases were African American women and children, 
challenging laws with a dramatically disparate impact on poor black families. 
Some also attacked illegitimacy penalties as violations of sexual privacy and 
liberty. But arguments emphasizing the unfairness of punishing innocent 
children for circumstances beyond their control won the day in court. By the 
early 1970s, despite other promising constitutional developments for 
nonmarital sex, procreation, and familial bonds, a child-focused approach 
dominated illegitimacy doctrine. 
 
focusing on how well a law served the government’s stated objective rather than on the legitimacy of 
the objective itself). 
 12. To the extent that the illegitimacy cases and the sex and racial equality cases seem 
connected in constitutional law, it is largely by analogy. Like race, the argument goes, illegitimacy 
remains outside the individual’s control and should not be a basis for invidious discrimination. And 
like sex, illegitimacy classifications are subject to an intermediate standard of equal protection 
scrutiny. The canonical constitutional sex equality cases cite to court decisions applying heightened 
scrutiny to illegitimacy classifications. But though many of the cases litigated by Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
in the 1970s overthrew government support for male supremacy within marriage, turning husbands 
and wives into fungible spouses, they did not question marital status as a basis for allocating 
government benefits in the first place. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); 
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); see also 
Serena Mayeri, “The First Order of Business”: Feminists Challenge Male Supremacy in Marriage 
(Sept. 20, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author). On Ginsburg’s constitutional 
strategy, see SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
REVOLUTION (2011); Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex 
Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83 (2010); Serena Mayeri, Reconstructing the Race-Sex 
Analogy, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1789 (2008). 
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Part II describes feminists’ alternative accounts of illegitimacy’s 
constitutional harm. Beginning in the early 1970s, feminists argued that 
“illegitimate” children’s inability to inherit from their fathers, or to hold them 
liable for child support, unjustly placed the entire burden of nonmarital sex, 
childbearing, and childrearing on mothers. Illegitimacy penalties such as 
mandatory paternity disclosure and bans on hiring unmarried parents also 
infringed on women’s decisional autonomy and reproductive freedom. But the 
feminist case against illegitimacy penalties never penetrated Supreme Court 
rulings. After child-focused arguments reached their apex, the 1970s ended 
with a series of defeats for illegitimacy plaintiffs. 
Part III investigates why more capacious accounts of illegitimacy’s 
constitutional harm fell by the wayside. Accidents of timing and procedural 
hurdles played a role, but so did deep reluctance to accept feminist arguments 
that challenged assumptions about women’s primary responsibility for 
nonmarital children, and about privatized dependency, sexual morality, and 
marital supremacy itself. Focusing on illegitimacy penalties’ harm to “hapless” 
and “innocent” children provided safe common ground in a polity increasingly 
fractured by matters of family structure and sexuality. By the late 1970s, larger 
political shifts eroded once promising constitutional doctrines such as sexual 
privacy, disparate impact, reproductive freedom, and sex equality. 
The illegitimacy cases altered the terms of marital supremacy, to be sure. 
But the Court’s failure to question governmental objectives—such as 
promoting marriage and deterring illicit relationships—meant that even as 
customary norms stigmatizing nonmarital sex and cohabitation eased, even as 
white and male supremacy became improper aims of government action, and 
even as purposefully punishing nonmarital children no longer passed 
constitutional muster, marriage remained a legitimate engine of privilege. By 
the turn of the twenty-first century, thousands of material benefits, large and 
small, depended on marital status. Constitutional contestation focused on 
access to marriage, not upon its legal and social primacy. 
The history recounted here has been almost entirely forgotten. 
Remembering it exposes the stakes of current struggles to reconcile marriage 
equality with other progressive goals. Critics have long worried that 
prioritizing marriage sidelined worthier causes and marginalized 
nonconforming individuals and families.13 Marriage equality advocates 
attacked restrictions on same-sex marriage with a rich constitutional arsenal 
that included powerful arguments about equality, dignity, and autonomy for 
 
 13. See, e.g., AGAINST EQUALITY: QUEER REVOLUTION, NOT MERE INCLUSION (Ryan 
Conrad ed., 2014); NANCY POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL 
FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW (2008); MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, 
POLITICS, AND THE ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE (1999); Katherine M. Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex 
Marriage Politics, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 236 (2006); Katherine M. Franke, Longing for Loving, 
76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685 (2008); see also Suzanne A. Kim, Skeptical Marriage Equality, 34 HARV. 
J. L. & GENDER 37 n.2 (2011) and sources cited therein. 
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gay and lesbian adults and their families. Still, activists, lawmakers, and judges 
on both sides of the same-sex marriage debate also invoked innocent children 
as primary victims or beneficiaries of same-sex marriage.14 “Illegitimacy as 
injury”15 made a quiet comeback, implicitly denigrating nonmarital children 
and families by reinforcing the superiority of marriage as the sine qua non of 
legitimate family formation. 
The hard-won triumph of same-sex couples in their struggle for the right 
to marry is worthy of joyful celebration. But whether this spectacular 
constitutional victory is the harbinger of greater social and material equality for 
diverse family forms remains to be seen. In United States v. Windsor, Justice 
Anthony Kennedy extolled the unique capacity of legal marriage to allow 
couples to “live with pride in themselves and their union,”16 and to “confer[] 
upon them a dignity and status of immense import.”17 In Obergefell v. Hodges, 
he declared, “Without the recognition, stability, and predictability marriage 
offers, children suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow 
lesser.”18 The children of couples who could not marry, he continued, “suffer 
the significant material costs of being raised by unmarried parents, relegated 
through no fault of their own to a more difficult and uncertain family life.”19 
Kennedy’s emphasis on the suffering of blameless nonmarital children has a 
political and constitutional history worth remembering. In a world in which 
marriage is both a privileged status and a status of the privileged, marriage 
equality that rests upon non-marriage’s ignominy risks reinforcing the many 
other status inequalities that taint the legacy of marital supremacy. 
 
 14. For a critical perspective on the invocation of children in the marriage equality debate, see, 
for example, Nancy D. Polikoff, For the Sake of All Children: Opponents and Supporters of Same-Sex 
Marriage Both Miss the Mark, 8 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 573 (2005). 
 15. See Murray, supra note 7, at 419–23. 
 16. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013). 
 17. Id. at 2692. Justice Kennedy’s tribute to marriage evoked earlier gestures toward 
marriage’s sacred and foundational status as a “basic civil right.” See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 
12 (1967) (“Marriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man, fundamental to our very existence and 
survival” (citations omitted)). Earlier, the Court declared marriage “the foundation of the family and 
society, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress.” Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 
190, 211 (1888). 
     18. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2590 (2015). 
       19. Id.; see also Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694 (declaring that same-sex couples’ inability to 
marry “humiliates tens of thousands of children,” making it “even more difficult for the children to 
understand the integrity and closeness of their own famil[ies] and [their] concord with other families in 
their communities and in their daily lives.”). For critiques of this aspect of Windsor, see, for example, 
Noa Ben-Asher, Conferring Dignity: The Metamorphosis of the Legal Homosexual, 37 HARV. J. L. & 
GENDER 243 (2014); Douglas NeJaime, Windsor’s Right to Marry, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 219 
(2013); Widiss, supra note 7. For early critical commentary on Obergefell, see, for example, Serena 
Mayeri, Marriage (In)equality and the Historical Legacies of Feminism, 6 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 
(forthcoming 2015) (on file with author); Melissa Murray, Obergefell v. Hodges and the New 
Marriage Inequality, 104 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (on file with author).  
1284 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  5:1277 
I. 
“HAPLESS AND INNOCENT CHILDREN”: THE EARLY ILLEGITIMACY LITIGATION, 
1966–1972 
Illegitimacy penalties occupied a peculiar position in midcentury law and 
public policy. Progressive reformers had long lamented the stigma and material 
disadvantages imposed upon nonmarital children as cruel and anachronistic 
relics. Indeed, reforms in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries ameliorated 
many of the harshest legal disabilities that attached under the common law, 
when a “bastard” was filius nullius—child of no one.20 By the 1960s, 
legislation in many states enabled some children to be legitimated by their 
mothers’ subsequent marriage, to inherit from their mothers and maternal 
relatives, and to make claims on their “natural fathers” for support.21 
Nevertheless, these reforms were uneven and incomplete: illegitimate children 
often could not inherit from their biological fathers or paternal relatives, 
receive government benefits to which legitimate children were entitled, sue for 
their parents’ wrongful death or workers’ compensation, or effectively enforce 
nonmarital fathers’ child support obligations.22 State level legal reforms 
proceeded in a lopsided fashion, shoring up the mother-child relationship but 
leaving most nonmarital children with little claim to support or care from their 
biological fathers.23 Federal law, too, contained a bewildering patchwork of 
statutory provisions, often relying on state law definitions and rules to 
determine whether and when illegitimate children could receive various Social 
Security and other benefits.24 
 
 20. At common law, “bastards” had no right to support or inheritance from their parents or 
other relatives and no right to adopt their biological fathers’ surnames. HARRY KRAUSE, 
ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 5 (1971). 
 21. See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA ch. 6 (1985); JOHN WITTE, JR., THE SINS OF THE FATHERS: THE 
LAW AND THEOLOGY OF ILLEGITIMACY RECONSIDERED ch. 5 (2009). 
 22. As Harry Krause wrote in 1966, “Differences in the fifty state legal systems and, for 
specific areas, federal law, are very pronounced and range from highly progressive to very traditional 
approaches.” Harry D. Krause, Bringing the Bastard into the Great Society—A Proposed Uniform Act 
on Legitimacy, 44 TEX. L. REV. 829, 830 (1966) (citations omitted); see also, e.g., CALEB FOOTE, 
ROBERT J. LEVY & FRANK E.A. SANDERS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW, ch. 1, § B 
(1966) (describing the “status of children born out of wedlock circa 1965”); Marylin Klosty & Howard 
J. Weiss, Editorial, Illegitimacy, 26 BROOK. L. REV. 45, 76–79 (1959) (chart comparing states’ various 
approaches to property rights of illegitimate versus legitimate children). 
 23. See, e.g., Krause, supra note 22, at 854 (“[S]tatutes have provided in nearly all states that 
in matters of inheritance the illegitimate occupies the same position with respect to his mother as a 
legitimate child.”). However, as Jacobus tenBroek wrote in 1964, “Lightening the public burden for 
support of the poor equally motivated the creation of both parents’ legal liability for their illegitimate 
children.” Jacobus tenBroek, California’s Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and 
Present Status, Part I, 16 STAN. L. REV. 257, 284 (1964). 
 24. See Note, The Rights of Illegitimates Under Federal Statutes, 76 HARV. L. REV. 337 
(1962) (explaining that illegitimate children’s rights under federal law often depended upon state law, 
and noting lack of clarity about which state rules should apply to the interpretation of a particular 
federal provision). State laws defined legitimacy quite disparately, and some states made legitimating a 
child more difficult than others. For instance, in some states, children could only be legitimated after 
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At the same time, many citizens and policymakers viewed “illegitimacy” 
as a more pressing social problem than ever. Rates of nonmarital childbearing 
climbed among both young white women and poor women of color. Social 
work professionals reframed white middle-class unwed pregnancy as a problem 
of individual psychological maladjustment, but conventional wisdom held that 
among nonwhite women, particularly African Americans, nonmarital 
childbearing reflected deeper cultural disorder.25 The 1965 Moynihan Report 
reinforced the pervasive belief that “illegitimacy” and “matriarchy” contributed 
to a “tangle of pathology” that fed poverty, crime, and juvenile delinquency in 
black communities.26 
Race and illegitimacy had long been intertwined.27 In the 1950s and 
1960s, public discourse increasingly associated nonmarital childbearing with 
rising public assistance costs and with unmarried African American mothers, 
who had only recently gained access to many federal and state social welfare 
programs.28 Hard won civil rights victories inspired resistance in the form of 
morals regulation; as historian Anders Walker has written, many efforts to 
punish nonmarital childbirth were thinly veiled attacks on racial 
desegregation.29 During this period, proposals for punitive anti-illegitimacy 
 
birth by the marriage of their biological parents; in other states, only fathers could legitimate (or 
“acknowledge”) children (with or without the mother’s consent); in still other states, mothers could do 
so unilaterally. To make matters more complicated, rules for establishing paternity also varied widely, 
with many states imposing statutes of limitation on paternity actions. See generally id. 
 25. See generally REGINA G. KUNZEL, FALLEN WOMEN, PROBLEM GIRLS: UNMARRIED 
MOTHERS AND THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF SOCIAL WORK, 1890–1945 (1993); RICKIE SOLINGER, 
WAKE UP LITTLE SUSIE: SINGLE PREGNANCY AND RACE BEFORE ROE V. WADE (1992). For 
contemporaneous assessments of differences in the perception and treatment of white and nonwhite 
unmarried mothers, see, for example, Ruth Chaskel, The Unmarried Mother: Is She Different?, CHILD 
WELFARE, Feb. 1967, at 65; Justine Wise Polier, Problems Involving Family and Child, 66 COLUM. L. 
REV. 305, 308 (1966). For a contemporaneous statistical analysis of illegitimacy rates among various 
demographic groups, see NATL. CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & 
WELFARE, PUB. NO. 75-1013, TRENDS IN ILLEGITIMACY: UNITED STATES 1940–1965 (1974). 
 26. DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION (1965). 
On the gender and racial politics of the Moynihan Report, see, for example, Serena Mayeri, 
Historicizing the “End of Men”: The Politics of Reaction(s), 93 B.U. L. Rev. 729 (2013). 
 27. See, e.g., PEGGY PASCOE, WHAT COMES NATURALLY: MISCEGENATION LAW AND THE 
MAKING OF RACE IN AMERICA (2009) (describing how anti-miscegenation laws effectively rendered 
interracial sex and childbearing illicit and illegitimate); Kristin A. Collins, Illegitimate Borders: Jus 
Sanguinis Citizenship and the Legal Construction of Family, Race, and Nation, 123 YALE L.J. 2134, 
2158 (2014) (detailing how, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, “restriction of father-
child citizenship transmission outside the marital family regularly operated to exclude nonwhite 
children from citizenship”); Adrienne D. Davis, The Private Law of Race and Sex: An Antebellum 
Perspective, 51 STAN. L. REV. 221, 221 (1999) (exploring the use of private law doctrines and the law 
of legitimacy to “reconcil[e] and preserv[e] both property rights and racial hierarchy”). 
 28. See, e.g., JILL QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE: HOW RACISM UNDERMINED THE 
WAR ON POVERTY (1994). 
 29. See generally ANDERS WALKER, THE GHOST OF JIM CROW: HOW SOUTHERN 
MODERATES USED BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION TO STALL CIVIL RIGHTS (2009); Anders Walker, 
Note, Legislating Virtue: How Segregationists Disguised Racial Discrimination as Moral Reform 
Following Brown v. Board of Education, 47 DUKE L.J. 399 (1997). To give just one relevant example, 
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laws—denial of public assistance, institutionalization of nonmarital children, 
sterilization, and imprisonment—were widely understood as part of the 
backlash against civil rights.30 As journalist Fred P. Graham put it in 1968, 
“‘Illegitimacy,’ like ‘crime in the streets,’ is becoming a substitute in many 
minds for the ‘Negro problem.’”31 
Illegitimacy litigation did not proceed from a carefully planned, 
incremental constitutional strategy. Cases cropped up organically, without the 
handpicked plaintiffs favored by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF) in 
earlier campaigns against de jure racial segregation, and later, by Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg’s American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) Women’s Rights Project 
in pursuit of sex equality. But the LDF and the ACLU did enter the fray, 
injecting broader concerns about race and poverty into their constitutional 
challenges to illegitimacy-based classifications. For a time, the ascendancy of 
civil rights and poverty law gave the young lawyers and scholars challenging 
illegitimacy penalties ammunition for their constitutional attacks. Civil 
libertarians and welfare rights lawyers also saw promise in the nascent 
jurisprudence of sexual privacy. This Part traces the origins, brief life, and 
premature demise of these arguments in early constitutional illegitimacy 
litigation. 
A. “Designed to Deprive a Single Class of Citizens”: Early Constitutional 
Arguments 
In 1960, Louisiana’s “suitable home” law, which withheld public 
assistance from mothers who had given birth outside of marriage, sparked a 
national outcry. The legislation, a direct response to racial desegregation 
efforts, purged tens of thousands of impoverished African American families 
from the state’s welfare rolls.32 By this time, the success of constitutional 
 
Mississippi abolished common law marriage in 1956 in an apparent attempt to bolster illegitimacy 
rates among African American families so that black children could be denied access to white schools. 
WALKER, THE GHOST OF JIM CROW, supra, at 41–43; see also FOOTE, LEVY & SANDERS, supra note 
22, at 117 n.116 (describing 1964 Louisiana statute criminalizing the act of giving birth to an 
“illegitimate” child, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:79.2 (Supp. 1964)); id. at 118 (noting that “such a 
deterrent approach is not limited to the deep South”). For the most influential contemporaneous 
analysis of the racial politics of welfare policy, see WINIFRED BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN 
(1965). 
 30. Such proposals were most common in, but not confined to, southern states. For press 
coverage of sterilization proposals, see, for example, Sterilization Urged to Cut Illegitimacy, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 11, 1959, at C8 (discussing proposed North Carolina bills); To Curb Illegitimacy, Sterilize 
Unwed Mothers, States’ Lawmakers Urge, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1960, at D1 (discussing proposed 
bills in Maryland and Virginia); Sterilization Urged to Cut Costs, CHICAGO TRIB., Mar. 1, 1961, at 1 
(discussing Illinois bill); Bill to Curb Illegitimacy is Signed in Mississippi, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1964 
(discussing enactment of Mississippi law authorizing imprisonment for up to ninety days as well as 
fines for unwed parents who had a second illegitimate child). 
 31. Fred P. Graham, It’s Tough to Be Illegitimate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1968, at E10. 
 32. On the Louisiana crisis, see, for example, JENNIFER MITTELSTADT, FROM WELFARE TO 
WORKFARE: THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF LIBERAL REFORM, 1945–1965, at 86–91 (2005); 
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challenges to racial segregation provided the legal tools to question illegitimacy 
penalties on equal protection grounds. On behalf of the ACLU, a young lawyer 
named Melvin Wulf wrote a brief to the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare (HEW) attacking Louisiana’s policy.33 Wulf stressed that Louisiana’s 
suitable home law was racially motivated, “a punitive step to deter its Negro 
citizens from pursuing their goal of equality.”34 Even if the Louisiana policy 
were not “designed to deprive a single class of citizens of rights to which they 
are otherwise entitled,” as it clearly was, discriminatory intent could be inferred 
from the policy’s severely disproportionate impact.35 
Wulf’s most novel argument came next: “We believe that any differential 
treatment to which out-of-wedlock children are subjected is invidious and 
likely unconstitutional.”36 Just as Brown v. Board of Education held that “the 
classification of Negroes qua Negroes was baseless,” the “differential treatment 
accorded a class of citizens designated as ‘illegitimate’ is equally baseless.”37 
Need, not status, was the appropriate criterion by which to determine welfare 
eligibility. 
Notably, Wulf’s memorandum did not deny that illegitimacy penalties 
might deter nonmarital sex and “promiscuity.” He wrote: “It may well be that if 
out-of-wedlock children are deprived of minimum satisfaction of their physical 
needs, thereby placing their lives in jeopardy, there will be a decrease in the 
relationships leading to illegitimate births.”38 But, he continued, “[I]t is clearly 
unreasonable to attempt to improve a home’s moral climate by starving its 
occupants to death.”39 
Wulf’s memo contained seeds of the constitutional arguments that 
litigators would later raise in court, including the illegitimacy penalties’ 
racially discriminatory intent and effect; the idea that illegitimacy-based 
 
see also Lisa Levenstein, From Innocent Children to Unwanted Migrants and Unwed Moms: Two 
Chapters in the Public Discourse on Welfare in the United States, 1960–1961, J. WOMEN’S HIST., 
Winter 2000, at 10–33 (comparing the framing of Louisiana’s anti-welfare measures to those in 
Newburgh, New York). 
 33. Wulf later described this as “the first memorandum on the unconstitutionality of 
differential treatment of children born out of wedlock.” Letter from Melvin Wulf to Norman Dorsen, 
(Nov. 20, 1967), collected in Norman Dorsen Papers, Tamiment Archive, Bobst Library, New York 
University [hereinafter Dorsen Papers]; see also MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND 
THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960–1973, at 84 (1993). 
 34. Memorandum from the ACLU on Louisiana Plan for Aid to Defendant Children, Filed 
with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, at 2 (Nov. 22, 1960) [hereinafter ACLU 
Memorandum to HEW], collected in Dorsen Papers, Box 32, Folder 11 (on file with the California 
Law Review). 
 35. Id. at 3. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 4. 
 38. Id. at 5. 
 39. Id. The state, Wulf reasoned, had more effective means of protecting children from 
immoral influences at its disposal: “If a home is in fact unsuitable because of a mother’s promiscuity,” 
a court could order removal of the children. Id. The ACLU, Wulf declared, was “not in favor of sin, 
but neither does it favor compounding sin with starvation.” Id. 
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distinctions were invidious discrimination rather than justifiable privileging of 
normative marital families; a reluctance to directly challenge the state interests 
in deterring nonmarital childbearing and regulating sexual morality; and 
skepticism about the state’s true motives, nurtured by the attenuated 
relationship between the means employed by the state and the ends purportedly 
sought. 
Several years later, Illinois law professor Harry Krause established 
himself as the leading legal authority on illegitimacy with a series of articles 
culminating in an influential 1971 book.40 Unlike many of the lawyers involved 
in the early illegitimacy cases, Krause’s practice background was in tax and 
international business transactions, not in civil rights and poverty law.41 But 
Krause quickly developed an academic portfolio in comparative family law and 
policy.42 In Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, published in 1967, Krause 
framed the stakes as “a child’s right to a familial relationship with his father,” 
which he argued was “more akin to a ‘fundamental right and liberty’ or a ‘basic 
civil right of man’ than to a mere economic interest” entitled to a presumption 
of constitutionality.43 He depicted illegitimacy as a “second-class status,” 
calling its impact “a psychic catastrophe.”44 And, like Wulf, Krause compared 
illegitimacy discrimination’s harm with that of racial segregation. Channeling 
Brown’s concern with “badges of inferiority” inflicted upon children, he called 
“the psychological effect of the stigma of bastardy . . . quite comparable to the 
damaging psychological effects upon the victims of racial discrimination.”45 
Krause deliberately emphasized the child’s plight, rather than that of his 
parents, and the paternal bond as the crucial loss suffered by nonmarital 
children. The “psychic catastrophe” language would be cited again and again in 
plaintiffs’ briefs challenging illegitimacy classifications, as would the analogy 
between illegitimacy and race. And Krause cannily perceived that children’s 
innocence could be “successfully exploited,” much like images of brave yet 
 
 40. KRAUSE, supra note 20. Krause’s articles published before the Supreme Court first 
addressed the illegitimacy question include Krause, supra note 22; Harry D. Krause, Equal Protection 
for the Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. REV. 477 (1967); Harry D. Krause, Bastards Abroad—Foreign 
Approaches to Illegitimacy, 15 AM. J. COMP. L. 727 (1967). For other early applications of equal 
protection analysis to illegitimacy classifications, see FOOTE, LEVY & SANDERS, supra note 22, at 72–
73 (1966); Note, “Suitable Home” Tests Under Social Security: A Functional Approach to Equal 
Protection, 70 YALE L.J. 1192 (1961). 
 41. Born in Germany in 1932, Krause immigrated to the United States as a college student and 
served in the U.S. Army before attending law school at the University of Michigan and working for 
Covington & Burling. See Harry D. Krause, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 667 (1997). 
 42.  Id.  
 43. Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, supra note 40, at 488 (emphasis added). 
 44. Id. (quoting Nandor Fodor, Emotional Trauma Resulting from Illegitimate Birth, 54 
ARCHIVES NEUROLOGY & PSYCHOL. 381, 381 (1945)). 
 45. Id. 
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vulnerable children enduring hostile, hysterical mobs resisting school 
integration spoke more eloquently than any legal brief ever could.46 
Child-focused arguments against illegitimacy penalties were nothing new. 
Historian Michael Grossberg describes post-revolutionary illegitimacy law 
reforms as “proceed[ing] from the conviction that parents’ sins should not be 
visited on the innocent issue.”47 Advocates for children, such as New York 
reformer and Judge Justine Wise Polier, had attacked the stigma and legal 
disabilities of illegitimacy in the 1940s and 1950s.48 What was new about the 
child-focused arguments of the 1960s was their context and their 
constitutionalization. In the past, critics of illegitimacy penalties had invoked 
morality, fairness, and an individual’s right not to be held responsible for the 
conduct of others. Until the civil rights victories of midcentury, they had little 
ammunition for arguments sounding in due process and equal protection. 
Krause’s article debuted an equal protection argument that focused on the 
relationship between legislative means and state objectives, rather than on 
challenging the normative assumptions underlying illegitimacy laws.49 Krause 
was careful not to question all laws privileging marriage and traditional family 
relationships—only those that punished children, who had no control over their 
parents’ marital status. 
Nor did Krause contest the government’s ability to regulate sexual 
activity. “There is no question that the state may properly regulate many 
aspects of sexual conduct. Our society holds that intercourse outside of 
marriage is undesirable, and thus the discouragement of ‘illicit’ intercourse is 
considered a proper end of legislation.”50 But the connection between 
illegitimacy penalties and the deterrence of nonmarital sex or unwed childbirth 
was remote: fathers, he pointed out, were more likely to be deterred if held 
responsible for the consequences of illicit sex. Mothers might be dissuaded by 
the “shame of illegitimate pregnancy” but were more likely to turn to birth 
control or abortion than to abstinence. 51 Krause did not question the validity of 
the government interest in combating illegitimacy. Rather, he argued that the fit 
between means and ends could not withstand constitutional scrutiny. 
Krause applied the equal protection guarantee to illegitimacy-based 
distinctions in child support, inheritance, the right to recover under wrongful 
 
 46. See id.; see also id. at 484 (“It is time that the matter be considered from the standpoint of 
the child!”); KRAUSE, supra note 20, at 294–95 (expressing frustration that “[w]ell-intentioned people 
have lavished disproportionate effort on the welfare mother”). 
 47. GROSSBERG, supra note 21, at 202. 
 48. See, e.g., Justine Wise Polier, Illegitimate!, WOMAN’S HOME COMPANION, Aug. 1947, at 
32. 
 49. Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, supra note 40, at 493 (“[I]f the state wishes 
to discourage casual unions, it should do so directly, as, for example, by laws punishing fornication or 
providing incentives for marriage.”). 
 50. Id. at 491–92. 
 51. Id. at 492 & n.62. 
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death and workers’ compensation statutes, and eligibility for benefits accrued 
through parental earnings and contributions, such as Social Security.52 Each of 
these discriminations would come under constitutional attack during the 
following decade. 
B. “Subject to Reexamination”: Levy and Glona 
The first illegitimacy cases to reach the Supreme Court, Levy v. 
Louisiana,53 and Glona v. American Guarantee and Liability Insurance 
Company,54 foreshadowed both the promise and the perils of attacking 
illegitimacy penalties under the Fourteenth Amendment. In court, advocates 
emphasized the unfairness and irrationality of penalizing innocent children for 
circumstances beyond their control, as well as the disparate impact of 
illegitimacy penalties on poor African American families. The Court’s 
decisions in Levy and Glona left ambiguous the scope of the illegitimacy cases’ 
challenge to marital supremacy and the racial and economic inequalities it 
reproduced. The opinions rendered governing constitutional principles obscure, 
and states’ prerogatives to punish parents for nonmarital childbearing remained 
uncertain. Outside of court, though, civil libertarians raised questions about the 
continuing viability of a regime that privileged formal marriage and curtailed 
sexual liberty. 
The Levy litigation began in 1964 when attorney Adolph Levy (no 
relation to the plaintiffs) filed a lawsuit in Louisiana seeking damages on behalf 
of Louise Levy’s five children for their mother’s wrongful death in a New 
Orleans hospital. His complaint depicted Louise Levy as a model mother and 
citizen: she worked hard, attended Catholic Mass regularly, and inculcated 
moral values in her children. She did not depend on welfare, scraping together 
money from her work as a domestic to send her children to parochial school. 
Her attorneys argued that Louise Levy’s children should be compensated for 
her death from hypertensive uremia, which occurred after a doctor failed to 
detect and treat her condition, as if they had been legitimate.55 
Levy stressed that the children’s inability to recover for their mother’s 
death would burden public coffers. “[T]he tortfeasor need reimburse no one. 
The State must support the tragic victims.”56 And he repeatedly proclaimed 
nonmarital children’s innocence: “[T]he sins of the parents are being visited 
upon the children who had absolutely nothing to do with their status.”57 Levy 
 
 52. See generally KRAUSE, supra note 20. 
 53. 391 U.S. 68 (1968). 
 54. 391 U.S. 73 (1968). 
 55. Petition for Damages Due to Malpractice on Behalf of Levy (La. Civ. Dist. Ct. for Orleans 
Dec. 16, 1964), reprinted in Appendix at 5, Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (No. 508). 
 56. Petition for Writs of Certiorari and Review to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, State of 
Louisiana at 4, Levy v. State (La. 1967) (No. 48518), collected in Dorsen Papers, Box 32, Folder 14. 
 57. Id. The petition continues: “[T]his case does not present to the Court the question of 
whether parents who may be morally blameful may recover for the wrongful death of their child. It 
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also made equal protection and due process arguments against the illegitimacy 
exclusion’s constitutionality, but with relatively little doctrinal support.58 
Recognizing that his clients’ case would benefit from greater constitutional 
expertise, Levy requested assistance from the ACLU. Norman Dorsen, a civil 
liberties expert and New York University law professor, essentially took over 
the case before the Supreme Court. Later that year, at the NAACP LDF’s 
request, Dorsen and Levy asked Harry Krause to author an amicus brief on the 
LDF’s behalf.59 
The LDF’s Leroy Clark requested that Krause “show the court that many 
policies which on their face are designed to control ‘morals’ or which bear 
heaviest on the poor, have a profound impact on the Negro community, which 
has a high rate of illegitimacy and poverty.”60 This argument about the impact 
of facially race-neutral but purposefully discriminatory policies on African 
Americans echoed claims the LDF made in school segregation, housing 
discrimination, and voting rights cases.61 
The Louisiana statute, Krause’s LDF brief argued, “discriminates on the 
basis of race.”62 This “covert discrimination” had two sources: 
“disproportionately more Negro children than white children are born out of 
wedlock,” and, “even more important[ly] . . . a high percentage (70%) of white 
illegitimate children are adopted . . . whereas very few (3–5%) Negro 
illegitimates find adoptive parents.”63 Together, these discrepancies meant that 
“95.8 percent of all persons affected by discrimination against illegitimates 
under the statute are Negroes. . . . [T]he classification of illegitimacy [here] . . . 
is a euphemism for discrimination against Negroes.”64 Race played a 
prominent role in Dorsen’s brief as well, but as an analogue to illegitimacy, 
rather than as an impetus for penalizing non-marriage. Dorsen and his 
 
presents solely the question of whether children, morally blameless, may be prevented from 
recovery . . . .” Id. 
 58. See, e.g., id. at 7–8. 
 59. See Letter from Norman Dorsen, N.Y.U. School of Law to Jack Greenberg, Director-
Counsel of NAACP LDF (Nov. 13, 1967), collected in Dorsen Papers, Box 32, Folder 13; Letter from 
Leroy Clark, NAACP LDF, to Norman Dorsen (Nov. 29, 1967), collected in Dorsen Papers, Box 32, 
Folder 13; Letter from Norman Dorsen to Leroy Clark (Dec. 1, 1967), collected in Dorsen Papers, Box 
32, Folder 13. 
 60. Letter from Leroy Clark, NAACP LDF, to Harry Krause, University of Illinois, School of 
Law, (Dec. 4, 1967), at 1, collected in Dorsen Papers, Box 32, Folder 13. 
 61. Id. Racially disparate impact had also been a focus of Wulf’s brief against the Louisiana 
suitable home law in 1960. See ACLU Memorandum to HEW, supra note 34. 
 62. Brief for NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund as Amicus Curiae at 18, Levy v. 
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1967) (No. 508), 1968 WL 112827. 
 63. Id. at 18–19. 
 64. Id. at 20. 
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colleagues argued that classifications based on illegitimacy, like those based on 
race, deserved strict scrutiny.65 
All of the briefs supporting the Levy children stressed that the central 
injustice imposed by discrimination based on illegitimacy was the punishment 
of children for their parents’ wrongful conduct.66 Consulting attorney Lois 
Sheinfeld wrote to Dorsen that courts were “showing an increasing awareness 
and sensitivity to punishment of status or conditions of being.”67 A recent 
lower court case had “lovely language on penalizing needy children because of 
the sexual activity of the mothers,”68 and courts had recently invalidated laws 
that punished the “status” of drug addict or vagrant, rather than unlawful 
conduct.69 Illegitimacy was “a status which is both involuntarily assumed and 
cannot be voluntarily quitted.”70 The Louisiana statute, the Levys’ final brief 
contended, denied nonmarital children due process “on the basis of a condition 
of birth and a status over which they had no control and are powerless to 
correct.”71 
The State of Louisiana minced no words in defending the statute’s 
exclusion of illegitimate children as necessary to preserve the institutions of 
“marriage and the legitimate family.”72 The State denied any intent to “punish[] 
illegitimates” or even to “discriminat[e] against immorality in sexual 
behavior.”73 Rather, Louisiana sought only “positive” ends such as “the 
encouragement of marriage” and “the preservation of the legitimate family as 
the preferred environment for socializing the child.”74 Defending the 
community’s “withholding [of] prestige and honor” from illegitimate families, 
Louisiana asserted: “If the community grants almost as much respect for non-
marriage as for marriage, illegitimacy increases.”75 Moreover, “illegitimate 
 
 65. Brief for Appellants at 9, Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (No. 508), 1967 WL 113865; see 
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 67. Letter from Lois P. Sheinfeld, N.Y.U. School of Law, to Norman Dorsen, regarding Levy: 
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conduct . . . .”). 
 72. Brief for the Attorney General, State of Louisiana at 3, Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 
(1967) (No. 508), 1968 WL 112828. 
 73. Id. at 4. 
 74. Id. at 4–5 (emphasis added). 
 75. Id. at 7. 
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daughters tend to err in the manner of their illegitimate mothers, producing 
more illegitimate children.”76 
The Levy children’s allies followed Krause in belittling the notion that 
denying illegitimate children the right to recover for the wrongful death of a 
parent would effectively deter illicit sexual behavior and prevent nonmarital 
childbearing. They did not, however, directly question the state interest in 
promoting marriage and discouraging illicit sex. Dorsen’s protégée Sylvia 
Law—then a third-year law student, later a leading feminist scholar and 
advocate—summed up the strategy: “We have not questioned the value of 
family (legitimate) system. We have shown that the discrimination here is 
wholly ineffectual in deterring illegitimacy or securing legitimate families.”77 
Accused by Louisiana of attacking traditional marriage and family, the 
Levys’ allies tried to strike a delicate balance in their characterization of Glona, 
Levy’s mirror image. Minnie Brade Glona challenged her inability to recover 
for the wrongful death of her illegitimate teenage son, Billy, who perished in a 
car accident in Louisiana. Ms. Glona enjoyed nothing comparable to the Levy 
children’s amicus support from several prominent civil rights organizations, 
nor did she receive counsel from elite attorneys and scholars. Indeed, the 
Levys’ attorneys were careful to distinguish Glona, which the Fifth Circuit had 
decided unfavorably in a dismissive per curiam ruling.78 “Denial of recovery to 
the mother,” the Levys’ lawyers argued, “involves neither the problem of 
economic dependence of child on mother that exists here nor the manifest 
inequity of punishing individuals—the illegitimate children—for the acts of 
others over whom they could have no control.”79 Mothers, the brief implied, 
were not comparably blameless. 
The Court decided Levy and Glona in the claimants’ favor. Justice 
William O. Douglas wrote short opinions in both cases that drew criticism for 
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WL 113866. 
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their enigmatic treatment of the constitutional issues at stake.80 In Levy, 
Douglas “start[ed] from the premise that illegitimate children are not 
‘nonpersons.’ They are human, live, and have their being.”81 He called the 
classification that prevented Louise Levy’s children from recovering for her 
wrongful death “invidious,” and asked, “When the child’s claim of damage for 
loss of his mother is in issue, why, in terms of ‘equal protection,’ should the 
tortfeasors go free merely because the child is illegitimate? Why should the 
illegitimate child be denied rights merely because of his birth out of 
wedlock?”82 
Douglas quoted more Shakespeare than precedent in Levy.83 He did little 
to clarify the standard of review for laws distinguishing between legitimate and 
illegitimate children. Douglas did suggest that the “intimate familial 
relationship between a child and his own mother” implicated a “basic civil 
right” and concluded: 
Legitimacy or illegitimacy of birth has no relation to the nature of the 
wrong allegedly inflicted on the mother. These children, though 
illegitimate, were dependent upon her; she cared for them and nurtured 
them; they were indeed hers in the biological and in the spiritual sense; 
in her death they suffered wrong in the sense that any dependent 
would.84 
Douglas’s opinion in Glona was less florid but equally cryptic.85 Glona, 
Douglas wrote, differed from Levy, “where by mere accident of birth the 
innocent, although illegitimate child was made a ‘nonperson’ by the 
legislature.”86 Douglas criticized Louisiana law for inconsistently penalizing 
illegitimacy, and wrote that the exclusion of mothers from recovery had “no 
possible rational basis . . . . It would, indeed, be farfetched to assume that 
women have illegitimate children so that they can be compensated in damages 
 
 80. See, e.g., KRAUSE, supra note 20, at 66 (“It is regrettable—and may mar the new law of 
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decision more carefully.”); Kenneth L. Karst, Book Review, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1028, 1032 (1976) 
(reviewing GERALD GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (9th ed.)) (calling 
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 81. Levy, 391 U.S. at 70. 
 82. Id. at 71. 
 83. See id. at 72 n.6 (“We can say with Shakespeare: ‘Why bastard, wherefore base? When 
my dimensions are as well compact, My mind as generous, and my shape as true, As honest madam’s 
issue? Why brand they us With base? with baseness? bastardy? base, base?’ King Lear, Act I, Scene 
2.”). Early drafts of Douglas’s opinions followed Shakespeare (and the petitioner’s brief) in referring 
at points to “bastards.” See Letter from Chief Justice Earl Warren to Justice William O. Douglas, on 
Levy and Glona (Apr. 18, 1968), collected in Earl Warren Papers, Library of Congress [hereinafter 
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 84. Levy, 391 U.S. at 71–72. 
 85. Glona v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968). 
 86. Id. at 75. 
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for their death.”87 This sentence questioning the rationality of the statute—the 
relationship between means and ends—became perhaps the most oft-cited 
aspect of Glona. But it also obscured the appropriate standard of review for 
illegitimacy-based classifications, and prompted even sympathetic 
commentators to accuse Douglas of using “brute force” to achieve the desired 
result.88 
Douglas likely believed it would be difficult to marshal a majority to 
declare illegitimacy classifications suspect. Justice Byron White at first 
objected to Douglas’s reference to “basic civil rights.”89 White apparently 
overcame his misgivings and joined Douglas’s opinion, but Justices John 
Marshall Harlan, Hugo Black, and Potter Stewart dissented from both Levy and 
Glona in a combined opinion authored by Harlan.90 To the dissenting Justices, 
“everything the Court says about affection, nurture, and dependence” was 
“irrelevant.” To impose a hierarchy of claimants on the basis of legal rather 
than biological relationships was perfectly constitutional, especially in light of 
the state’s unchallenged power “to provide that people who choose to live 
together should go through the formalities of marriage.”91 
Justice Douglas’s opinions in Levy and Glona left ambiguous the 
magnitude of the Court’s departure from traditional deference to states’ ability 
to promote marriage and the legitimate family.92 But the decisions inspired 
hope among civil libertarians that the Court might look askance at laws that 
distinguished between married and unmarried parents as well as their 
 
 87. Id. (echoing appellant’s brief); see also Bench Memorandum from CHW to Chief Justice 
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 88. Herbert Semmel, Social Security Benefits for Illegitimate Children after Levy v. 
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least it seems that we have. I doubt that Levy belongs in this group but perhaps you disagree. 
Id. White also drafted a concurrence, never filed, in which he characterized the challenged distinction 
as “irrational and arbitrary.” See Draft Concurrence in Levy v. Louisiana (May 16, 1968), at 4, 
collected in Byron R. White Papers, Library of Congress [hereinafter White Papers], Box 126, Folder 
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 91. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 73, 78, 80 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 92. For an argument that Levy and Glona are less progressive than is often recognized, see 
Murray, supra note 7, at 390–99. 
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children,93 as John “Chip” Gray and David Rudovsky suggested hopefully in a 
widely cited 1969 article.94 The authors, recent law school graduates who had 
worked with Dorsen on the case, contended that Douglas had effectively 
applied strict scrutiny in Levy.95 They interpreted Glona to mean that 
discrimination against unmarried parents, too, should be constitutionally 
suspect. Further, they contended, “even assuming that the state can 
constitutionally regulate extramarital sexual activity, it should be required to 
proceed with care in an area where both intimate human relationships and long-
standing prejudices are involved.”96 
Unlike Krause and the Levy and Glona briefs, the out-of-court writings of 
Dorsen, Gray, and Rudovsky did not assume an unfettered state prerogative to 
regulate extramarital sexual activity.97 They suggested, anticipating a Supreme 
Court ruling still more than three decades in the future,98 that “the ‘zone of 
privacy’ in the area of sexual relationships in marriage,” recognized by the 
Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, “should include private sexual activity 
between consenting adults.”99 
Strikingly, the authors also challenged the legal primacy of marriage. The 
asserted state interest in “deter[ring] illegitimacy,” they wrote, boiled down to 
an interest in “formal marriages as such.”100 And “[t]he question whether 
formal marriage promotes the interests traditionally associated with that 
institution . . . certainly is subject to reexamination in light of developing 
concepts of individual freedom and morality.”101 The authors pointed out that 
“[i]ncreasingly the right of government to prohibit or discourage ‘immoral’ 
 
 93. Notably, Justice Douglas’s original draft of Levy did not leave this impression. In an early 
version of the opinion he wrote, “If the constitutional question arose under an Act making father and 
mother liable for producing illegitimate children, we would have a different problem. Here we are not 
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re the opinion: !!!” See William O. Douglas, First Circulated Draft of Levy Decision, at 1, collected in 
Douglas Papers, Box 1423, Folder 508. 
 94. John C. Gray, Jr. & David Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate: Levy v. 
Louisiana and Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., 118 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 15–18 
(1969). 
 95. Id. at 4–5. They also suggested, optimistically, that Levy might “be read to support the 
emergence of preferred social and economic rights,” potentially including the “right to receive welfare 
benefits” that anti-poverty lawyers were seeking in a contemporaneous litigation campaign. Id. at 5. 
 96. Id. at 15 (emphasis added). 
 97. Norman Dorsen & David Rudovsky, Comment, Equality for the Illegitimate?, WELFARE 
L. BULL., May 1967, at 15. 
 98. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 99. Gray & Rudovsky, supra note 94, at 16; see also Dorsen & Rudovsky, supra note 97,  
at 15. 
 100. Gray & Rudovsky, supra note 94, at 16. 
 101. Id. at 17. 
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conduct which damages no other public interest has been seriously 
challenged.”102 
Of course, many (including Harry Krause, arguably the most prolific and 
influential illegitimacy expert in the 1970s) continued to question the premise 
of the civil libertarians’ out-of-court argument—that the “immoral conduct” of 
illegitimacy damaged no other public interest. But as the next Section 
describes, Dorsen, Gray, and Rudovksy were not alone. Plaintiffs and lawyers 
in welfare rights cases seized on the promise of Griswold to articulate a much 
more expansive vision of sexual privacy and autonomy than the Court’s 
opinions recognized.103 
C. “I Told Her It Was None of Her Business”: King v. Smith 
In King v. Smith, Mrs. Sylvester Smith challenged Alabama’s “substitute 
father” regulation, which denied public assistance to mothers suspected of 
having extramarital sexual relationships.104 Such regulations were widely 
understood to serve the dual purpose of punishing African Americans and 
privatizing dependency by withholding public benefits from nonmarital 
families.105 King v. Smith was a centerpiece of the welfare rights movement’s 
“Southern Strategy,” which targeted the most egregious policies enacted in the 
Deep South, where the connection between morals regulation and resistance to 
African American civil rights would be glaringly apparent.106 
Whereas the Levy children’s attorneys succeeded in portraying Louise 
Levy as a model of maternal devotion, piety, and self-sufficiency, Smith 
resisted pressures to conform to conventional notions of respectability. 
Informed by her caseworker that her family of four children and one grandchild 
would be ineligible for Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) benefits if she did 
not contradict rumors that she had an intimate relationship with Willie 
Williams, a longtime family friend and a married father of nine children, Smith 
flatly refused to confirm or deny the affair. “I told her it was none of her 
business,” Smith recalled.107 She also informed her (white) caseworker that she 
had every intention of “going with” whomever she wished so long as she was 
young enough to enjoy the company of men.108 The Smith family could not 
forgo even Alabama’s stingy ADC benefit lightly; three of Smith’s children 
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lived with their grandmother part-time while Smith worked daily eight-hour 
shifts as a cook in Selma for sixteen to twenty dollars per week.109 
Smith’s declaration of sexual independence and insistence that her 
personal life was nobody’s business did not translate perfectly into legal or 
constitutional claims. But her arguments sounded in terms of sexual privacy 
and the right not to have government benefits conditioned upon marriage or 
celibacy.110 Smith’s attorney, New York anti-poverty lawyer Martin Garbus, 
argued that questioning a mother about her “most intimate relationships” and 
requiring answers as a condition of receiving benefits “violates her right to 
privacy,” infringing upon her freedom of association in a manner that was 
“destructive of her personal relationships and [that] violate[d] her and her 
children’s constitutional rights.”111 Garbus did not concede Alabama’s “right to 
regulate nonmarital relationships” and “prohibit immoral conduct”; rather, he 
echoed the civil libertarians’ skepticism about such regulations’ 
constitutionality.112 
Garbus also made arguments similar to those presented in Levy.113 There 
was little question that the substitute father regulations had been enacted (as 
opposed to merely implemented) as part of a political program targeted 
specifically at curtailing African Americans’ right to receive public 
assistance.114 Alabama nevertheless denied any racial motivation and insisted 
that the policy was designed not to prevent or punish sexual immorality, but 
rather to exploit untapped resources and equalize the position of marital and 
nonmarital households. Welfare department head Ruben King’s—and 
segregationist Governor George Wallace’s—oft-quoted position was: “if a man 
wants to play, then let him pay; and if he has the pleasures of a husband, then 
he ought to have the responsibilities of a husband.”115 Asked whether he 
considered the regulation punitive, King answered in the negative. “[T]he 
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 111. Brief for Appellees at 8, King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (No. 949), 1968 WL 112516. 
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mother has a choice in this situation to give up her pleasures or to act like a 
woman ought to act and continue to receive aid.”116 What about the children? 
asked Garbus. King had no answer. 
Neither the federal district court nor the Supreme Court addressed 
Garbus’s arguments about race and illegitimacy-based discrimination, denial of 
due process, or sexual privacy and freedom of association. A three-judge panel 
in the Middle District of Alabama acknowledged the evidence of racially 
discriminatory purpose and effect in a footnote but did not base its equal 
protection ruling on the racist origins or impact of the substitute father 
regulation.117 “The expressed interest of the State . . . in not desiring to 
underwrite financially or approve situations which are generally considered 
immoral is a laudable one,” said the court.118 The judges found the law 
“irrational” and “unreasonable,” because “[t]he punishment under the 
regulation is against needy children, not against the participants in the conduct 
condemned by the regulation.”119 
The Supreme Court adopted a similarly child-focused approach, but 
avoided the constitutional questions. Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote for a 
unanimous Court that Congress had “determined that immorality and 
illegitimacy should be dealt with through rehabilitative measures rather than 
measures that punish dependent children, and that protection of such children is 
the paramount goal of AFDC.”120 In closing, Warren was careful “to 
emphasize” that Alabama remained free to “discourag[e] illicit sexual behavior 
and illegitimacy . . . by other means, subject to [unspecified] constitutional 
limitations.”121 Though a major victory for welfare rights advocates,122 King v. 
Smith was hardly a ringing endorsement of Mrs. Smith’s right to sexual and 
economic autonomy. 
Justice Douglas saw King v. Smith as not only a welfare case, but also an 
illegitimacy case; not merely a question of statutory interpretation but also one 
of constitutional law.123 His concurrence found Alabama rule’s punishing 
children for their mothers’ “sin” constitutionally infirm, and he placed “sin” in 
quotation marks throughout his opinion.124 Douglas believed Levy, decided less 
than a month earlier, to be exactly on point.125 The substitute father regulation 
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was “aimed at punishing mothers who have nonmarital sexual relations.”126 In 
a “comparable situation,” the Court had held that the Equal Protection Clause 
“barred discrimination against illegitimate children.”127 Douglas reserved 
judgment on “[w]hether the mother alone could be constitutionally cut off from 
assistance because of her ‘sin.’”128 He thought “the immorality of the mother 
has no rational connection with the need of her children under any welfare 
program.”129 Douglas’s concurrence came closer than the majority opinion to 
questioning whether punishing or deterring mothers’ sexual relationships was a 
proper aim of government, but even he did not directly challenge this objective. 
In the months after Levy, Glona, and King, several state courts struck 
down statutory discriminations against illegitimate children, often using child-
focused language.130 Notably, though some commentators read the decision 
expansively,131 Glona, in contrast to Levy, was rarely parsed by courts in these 
years,132 except to cast doubt on the deterrent effect of illegitimacy-based 
discrimination on nonmarital sex.133 Courts also cited Glona to distinguish the 
case as involving a presumptively genuine mother-child tie rather than a more 
tenuous or difficult-to-prove father-child relationship.134 Indeed, the father-
child relationship went to the heart of the remaining legal distinctions between 
legitimate and illegitimate children. 
D. “Illicit and Beyond the Recognition of the Law”: Labine v. Vincent 
By the early 1970s, many states had lightened or eliminated illegitimacy 
penalties for nonmarital children in other fields, but inheritance law remained 
the third rail of constitutional challenges. Even Dorsen and Rudovsky initially 
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hesitated to endorse full equality in inheritance law for nonmarital children,135 
perhaps understanding that equality threatened ancient principles of Anglo-
American property law, raised thorny problems of proof, and caused otherwise 
sympathetic judges to balk. Many opponents of illegitimacy penalties 
eventually settled on the position that, to the extent fathers could reliably be 
identified, nonmarital children should inherit on the same terms as marital 
children—that is, fathers should not be conclusively presumed to intend that 
only their legitimate children inherit.136 
It was not long before this very question reached the Supreme Court. In 
1962, forty-two-year-old Lou Bertha Patterson gave birth to Rita Nell Vincent, 
while living with Rita’s father, seventy-year-old Ezra Vincent, in rural 
Louisiana. Vincent formally acknowledged Rita as his child, which obliged 
him to support her, and he and Patterson raised Rita together until his death six 
years later. Vincent left no will, no spouse, and no legitimate children.137 
Patterson had been married before and had, by 1971, married again and become 
Lou Bertha Labine, but she never married Vincent. Under Louisiana’s intestate 
succession law, an illegitimate child could only inherit if a decedent left no 
ancestors or collateral relatives;138 because two siblings survived Vincent, Rita 
lost any claim to his estate. Labine appealed on her daughter’s behalf, 
challenging the constitutionality of the succession hierarchy on equal 
protection grounds. 
The Louisiana Court of Appeal denied Labine’s appeal, distinguishing the 
inheritance laws from wrongful death statutes both in their potential deterrent 
effect on nonmarital childbearing and in their goal of preserving the stability of 
land titles.139 Whereas it might be difficult to foresee death by tort, “all men 
must die and leave their property behind for their successors,” so “the denial of 
inheritance rights to illegitimates might reasonably be viewed as encouraging 
marriage and legitimation of children.”140 The exclusion also served “the 
prompt and effective determination of the valid ownership of property left by 
decedents,” protecting estates from “unknown and not easily ascertained 
claims.”141 The Louisiana Supreme Court summarily affirmed.142 
The facts of Labine v. Vincent were sympathetic—Rita’s father had 
formally acknowledged her,143 so his paternity was undeniable. There were no 
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wife and legitimate children whose “family unity” would be disrupted by a 
nonmarital child’s inheritance. Had Rita been legitimate, “she would have 
inherited Ezra Vincent’s entire estate since she was his only child.”144 
Moreover, Vincent’s brother and sister had difficulty proving their relationship 
to the deceased.145 Further, the Louisiana courts had also denied Rita 
“alimony” from Vincent’s estate, apparently because she was already receiving 
federal social security survivors’ benefits.146 Making the most of these facts, 
Labine’s attorney, James J. Cox, opened his brief to the U.S. Supreme Court by 
characterizing his client as “a destitute Negro child . . . who was born out of 
wedlock.”147 
As an amicus in Labine, the ACLU raised many of the same arguments 
presented by the briefs in Levy. The ACLU’s Labine brief, authored primarily 
by Krause in consultation with Dorsen and Wulf, argued that illegitimacy-
based classifications had a disproportionate impact on African Americans and 
should be suspect based on an analogy to (and overlap with) racial 
classifications.148 With new ammunition from Justice Douglas’s opinion in 
Glona, the brief also called into question the deterrent effect on illicit sex of 
disinheriting nonmarital children.149 
There were subtle differences from Levy as well. In the interim, the Court 
had decided Dandridge v. Williams, a challenge to Maryland’s cap on the total 
amount of AFDC benefits a family could receive, regardless of family size.150 
The plaintiffs unsuccessfully argued that such restrictions violated equal 
protection in part because of their disparate impact on large, impoverished 
families.151 Dandridge dashed advocates’ hopes that the Court would recognize 
poverty as a suspect classification, and language about discrimination against 
or disparate impact on the poor receded from the illegitimacy cases.152 On the 
other hand, Labine, unlike Levy and Glona, presented an opportunity for 
Krause to bolster the father-child relationship he considered most crucial. 
Another significant difference from Levy and Glona: the Court’s 
composition. In 1968, Chief Justice Earl Warren retired. President Richard 
Nixon’s replacement, Warren Burger, initiated a rightward shift that was still 
incomplete when the Justices heard arguments in Labine in January 1971. By 
then, Harry A. Blackmun, a childhood friend and putative protégé of Burger’s 
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had joined the Court, replacing the more liberal Abe Fortas. Burger seemed 
likely to join the Levy and Glona dissenters (Harlan, Black, and Stewart) in 
upholding the Louisiana inheritance law, while the four remaining members of 
the Levy/Glona majority (Douglas, Brennan, White, and Marshall) inclined 
toward invalidation.153 In Labine, therefore, the newly minted Justice 
Blackmun would cast a decisive vote. 
Blackmun’s initial instinct was to sympathize with Rita Nell Vincent. 
“The case is a rather good one factually,” he reflected.154 Paternity was not in 
question, and the competing relatives were neither ancestors nor descendants of 
the decedent. Rita, Blackmun reflected, “is just as much a child of the decedent 
as a legitimate child would be and it is unfair to penalize her for her illegitimate 
status. Illegitimacy is not her fault.”155 On the other hand, laws “which g[a]ve 
priority to legitimacy encourage[d] marriage and family status,” and avoided 
problems of proof in closer cases. Levy and Glona, though “not exactly the 
same” as Labine, “afford[ed] a precedent,” Blackmun wrote.156 All in all, 
Blackmun’s “general leaning” was “in favor of the acknowledged child.”157 He 
worried, however, about the “logical difficulty in drawing the line at that 
point.”158 It seemed to him that “any theory which favors an acknowledged 
child . . . has to go all the way and . . . favor any illegitimate child.”159 This 
brought Blackmun back to his concern about “spurious claims” and the 
“difficult aspect of proving paternity.”160 
Blackmun’s clerk, Daniel B. Edelman, did not share his ambivalence. It 
was clear to Edelman, who later became a noted civil rights attorney, that 
Louisiana’s inheritance law should be unconstitutional under Levy. Edelman 
found Justice Black’s draft majority opinion “disturbing and unsatisfying to say 
the least,” and he wrote passionate memoranda excoriating Black’s 
circulations.161 Stewart’s clerk Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. was nearly as scathing in 
his denunciation of Black’s opinion.162 
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 162. “[I]f there’s any tenable reason for the decision in the opinion I can’t find it,” he wrote to 
the Justice. Letter from Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Clerk to Justice Potter Stewart, to Justice Potter Stewart, 
regarding Labine v. Vincent, at 1, collected in Potter Stewart Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, 
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Despite their clerks’ entreaties, Blackmun and Stewart joined Black’s 
abrupt retreat from Levy and Glona. Stewart had dissented in the earlier cases, 
and Blackmun’s vote with the majority in Labine surprised few; before 
Blackmun’s authorship of Roe v. Wade and his drift to the left in subsequent 
years, he and Burger were often dubbed the (conservative) “Minnesota twins.” 
Indeed Blackmun’s first opinion for the Court upheld “midnight raids” on the 
homes of welfare recipients.163 
Opponents of illegitimacy penalties had compared them to racial 
classifications in a bid for strict judicial scrutiny; Justice Black’s opinion for a 
five-to-four majority in Labine instead analogized illegitimate children to 
“concubines.”164 
The social difference between a wife and a concubine is analogous to 
the difference between a legitimate and an illegitimate child. One set 
of relationships is socially sanctioned, legally recognized, and gives 
rise to various rights and duties. The other set of relationships is illicit 
and beyond the recognition of the law.165 
The State could, therefore, “assert its power to protect the wife and children 
against the claims of a concubine and her children,” Black wrote.166 Black’s 
opinion bolstered, in no uncertain terms, the State’s prerogative to privilege 
marriage and to denigrate nonmarital relationships. 
In dissent, Justice William Brennan’s indignation was palpable—and 
child-centered. His opening paragraph accused the majority of “uphold[ing] the 
untenable and discredited moral prejudice of bygone centuries which 
vindictively punished not only the illegitimates’ parents, but also the hapless, 
and innocent, children.”167 States could incentivize marriage “far more directly 
by focusing on the parents whose actions the State seeks to influence.”168 As 
much as he abhorred Black’s cavalier dismissal of discrimination, Brennan’s 
dissent reinforced the distinction between culpable unmarried parents on the 
one hand, and their blameless children on the other.169 
 
Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University [hereinafter Stewart Papers], Box 247, Folder 2885. Rowe 
importuned Stewart to at least write a separate concurrence to no avail. Id. 
 163. See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971); LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE 
BLACKMUN 61–62 (2005). 
 164. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 538 (1971). 
 165. Id. Justice Brennan’s “Case History” of Labine noted that the language “illicit and beyond 
the recognition of the law” was a late addition to Justice Black’s majority opinion. Case History, 
Labine v. Vincent, at xiv–xv, collected in William J. Brennan, Jr., Papers, Library of Congress, Box 
II:6, Folder 8. 
 166. Labine, 401 U.S. at 538. 
 167. Id. at 541 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 168. Id. at 558. 
 169. “[T]he formality of marriage,” he wrote, “primarily signifies a relationship between 
husband and wife, not between parent and child.” Id. at 552–53. He also approvingly quoted a North 
Dakota decision invalidating a similar law “punish[ing] innocent children for their parents’ 
transgressions.” Id. at 558–59. 
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E. “No Child Is Responsible for His Birth”: Weber v. Aetna Casualty 
Labine horrified opponents of illegitimacy penalties.170 Many liberals 
worried that the departures of Justices Black and Harlan over the next several 
months would allow Nixon to scuttle hard-won gains in civil rights and civil 
liberties. By the time the Court heard its next illegitimacy case, Weber v. Aetna 
Casualty, Justices Lewis F. Powell, Jr., a conservative Democrat and racial 
moderate from Virginia, and William H. Rehnquist, a conservative Republican, 
had joined the Court. 
Like Levy, Glona, and Labine, the Weber case originated in Louisiana and 
involved an African American family. Willie Mae Weber had lived with Henry 
Clyde Stokes for three years, often caring for his four legitimate children while 
he was on the road as a truck driver and bearing two of Stokes’s children, one 
posthumously.171 Weber described herself as his “common law wife,”172 
although Stokes remained married to the mother of his children, and Louisiana 
did not recognize common law marriage in any event.173 Stokes and Weber 
apparently did not marry because Stokes’s wife was mentally ill and often 
hospitalized,174 presumably making divorce difficult. When Stokes died in a 
job-related accident, his legitimate children reached a settlement with the 
insurance company that left nothing for his illegitimate children.175 Willie Mae 
Weber appealed on behalf of her children, Letha Marie and Joseph, challenging 
the exclusion of illegitimate children from the statutory definition of “child.”176 
The Louisiana Supreme Court denied her claims.177 
The arguments presented to the Court in Weber represented a departure 
from prior illegitimacy cases. Ironically, race virtually disappeared from the 
first illegitimacy case argued by an African American attorney, and not by his 
choice. Vanue Lacour, one of only a handful of black lawyers practicing in 
Louisiana, had experience litigating civil rights cases and would go on to a 
distinguished career as a professor at a historically black law school in Baton 
 
 170. See, e.g., Letter from Norman Dorsen to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. (April 26, 1971), 
collected in Dorsen Papers, Box 29, Folder 16 (expressing “disappointment” at the Labine decision 
and complimenting Justice Brennan for a “powerful” dissent). 
 171. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 165 (1972); see also State ex rel. Stokes v. 
Stokes, 222 So. 2d 573 (La. Ct. App. 1969); Answer of Willie Mae Weber, Stokes v. Aetna Cas. & 
Sur. Co., No. 129,119 (La. 19th Judicial Dist. Ct. E. Baton Rouge Parish Mar. 16, 1968), reprinted in 
Appendix at 20–21, Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (No. 70-5112). 
 172. See Answer of Willie Mae Weber, supra note 171. 
 173. On the disparate impact on poor women and women of color of failing to recognize 
common law marriage, see Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law 
Marriage, 75 OR. L. REV. 709 (1996). 
 174. Weber, 406 U.S. at 165. 
 175. Id. at 166–68 (explaining that under Louisiana law, unacknowledged illegitimate children 
could only recover if legitimate children did not exhaust available funds). 
 176. Id. 
 177. Stokes v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 242 So.2d 567 (La. 1970), rev’d sub nom. Weber v. 
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972). 
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Rouge.178 When Lacour wrote to the ACLU to ask for amicus assistance, he 
specifically requested an “emphasis on the fact that the practical effect of the 
law excluding illegitimates from enjoying an equal right to workmen’s 
compensation is to discriminate against black people.”179 
The ACLU filed an amicus brief, but apparently rejected Lacour’s 
suggested angle.180 Rather than detailing the disparate impact of illegitimacy 
penalties on African Americans or arguing illegitimacy was a suspect 
classification, as they had in past cases, the claimants emphasized the 
continuing vitality of Levy after Labine, and argued that workers’ 
compensation benefits were more similar to wrongful death recovery than to 
inheritance.181 As a result, neither of the Justices who wrote in Weber had been 
exposed to the race- (and poverty-) based arguments that their more senior 
colleagues had heard in Levy, Glona, and Labine.182 
The Weber strategy worked: at Conference, six of the nine Justices voted 
to reverse, with Burger and Blackmun tentatively on board.183 Burger, who had 
expressed skepticism about Lacour’s position at oral argument, may have voted 
with the majority so that he, rather than Douglas, could assign the opinion.184 
Powell would write one of his first opinions for the Court in Weber, over a 
dissent from Rehnquist.185 
Powell assigned the case to clerk J. Harvie Wilkinson III, the son of close 
family friends who had welcomed the Powells into their Richmond home for 
many Sunday dinners.186 Wilkinson’s initial draft drew praise from Powell, 
who wrote, “Your draft opinion . . . is very good indeed, and I think very little 
 
 178. See Russell L. Jones, African American Legal Pioneers: A Biography of Vanue B. Lacour 
“A Social Engineer,” 23 S.U. L. REV. 63 (1995). 
 179. Letter from Vanue Lacour to Mel Wulf, Legal Dir. of ACLU (Nov. 16, 1971), collected in 
Dorsen Papers, Box 35, Folder 12. 
 180. See Brief for ACLU as Amicus Curiae, Weber, 406 U.S. 164 (No. 70-5112). 
 181. Id. 
 182. It is quite possible, even probable, that Powell would not have discussed the racial impact 
of illegitimacy classifications anyway, but the absence of such arguments from the briefs likely 
ensured their absence from the opinion. 
 183. See Conference Notes, Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (Feb. 18, 1972), collected 
in Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Papers, Powell Archives, Washington and Lee School of Law [hereinafter 
Powell Papers]. 
 184. It seems likely that Douglas would have assigned the opinion to himself. 
 185. See Conference Notes, Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra note 183 (noting 
Burger’s “tentative” vote at conference to reverse). 
 186. See J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Lewis F. Powell, Jr. — A Personal View, 65 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 3, 3–4 (2008). On Powell’s friendship with Wilkinson’s father, J. Harvie Wilkinson, Jr., see 
JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.: A BIOGRAPHY (2d ed. 2001) (passim). Powell 
was sworn in on January 7, 1972; the Court heard oral arguments in Weber on February 28. See Joan 
Biskupic & Fred Barbash, Retired Justice Lewis Powell Dies at 90, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 1998, A1; 
see also Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 92 S. Ct. 1400, 1400 (1972). 
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revision is required.”187 Powell’s only real criticism concerned Wilkinson’s 
final paragraph, where the clerk began: 
Our legal experiment with illegitimacy has always risked being an 
ineffectual attempt to punish the parent by stigmatizing the child. It 
has refuted the notion that legal burdens in our society bear some 
relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing and that no 
man under our system of law be unduly victimized by the fortuitious 
conditions and circumstances of his birth. Though it may not always 
void them, the Fourteenth Amendment peers most searchingly at 
statutory classifications and statuses over which individuals have slight 
or no control.188 
Here, Wilkinson cited several cases involving race discrimination, 
including Brown v. Board of Education and Hirabayashi v. United States.189 
He continued: 
No child controls his illegitimacy. What social opprobrium these 
hapless children may suffer we are powerless to prevent, but the most 
senseless of their legal burdens the Equal Protection Clause compels 
us to eliminate. We can see most poignantly the fallacy of 
discriminating between classes of offspring where, as in the case 
before us, the deprivation was so equally shared; where, as here, the 
legitimate and the illegitimate are alike without a father.190 
Powell gently urged Wilkinson to tone down this language. He wrote, 
Your last page or two—while beautifully written—may sound a little 
more like a social studies lecture than a judicial decision. I like what 
you have written and hesitate to modify or omit much of it, but let’s 
take a look at it—asking the question whether, in the US Reports, it 
will seem a little overzealous in the social implications?191 
In the end, Powell’s Weber opinion closely resembled Wilkinson’s draft. 
Finding Levy to be the “applicable precedent,”192 the decision—unanimous 
except for Rehnquist—resoundingly reinforced the child-focused critique of 
illegitimacy penalties. Powell and Wilkinson intentionally left the standard of 
review ambiguous, writing that the “essential inquiry” in equal protection cases 
involved examining what “legitimate state interest” the “classification 
promote[d]” and asking “[w]hat fundamental personal rights” it “might . . . 
 
 187. Memorandum from Justice Powell to Mr. Wilkinson, No. 70-5112, Weber v. Aetna (Mar. 
13, 1972), at 1, collected in Powell Papers, Weber v. Aetna file. 
 188. J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, First Draft of Weber v. Aetna Opinion (March 10, 1972), at 14, 
collected in Powell Papers, Weber v. Aetna file. 
 189. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S 81 
(1943). 
 190. Wilkinson, First Draft of Weber v. Aetna Opinion, supra note 188, at 14–15. 
 191. Memorandum from Justice Powell to Mr. Wilkinson, No. 70-5112, Weber v. Aetna (Mar. 
13, 1972), at 2, collected in Powell Papers, Weber v. Aetna file. 
 192. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172 (1972). 
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endanger.”193 The opinion affirmed that “the regulation and protection of the 
family unit have indeed been a venerable state concern.”194 The Court did “not 
question the importance of that interest” but rather “how the challenged statute 
will promote it”195—that is, the relationship between means and ends. Quoting 
Glona, Powell rejected the notion that “persons will shun illicit relations 
because the offspring may not one day reap the benefits of workmen’s 
compensation.”196 
Powell’s closing paragraphs retained much of the substance of 
Wilkinson’s “social studies lecture,” albeit stated somewhat more concisely 
and with fewer rhetorical flourishes. Weber’s final paragraph would be quoted 
again and again in future illegitimacy cases: 
The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society’s 
condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage. 
But visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and 
unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is 
contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should 
bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. 
Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the 
illegitimate child is an ineffectual—as well as unjust—way of 
deterring the parent. Courts are powerless to prevent the social 
opprobrium suffered by these hapless children, but the Equal 
Protection Clause does enable us to strike down discriminatory laws 
relating to status of birth where—as in this case—the classification is 
justified by no legitimate state interest, compelling or otherwise.197 
Weber thus solidified the child-focused account of illegitimacy’s harm: 
nonmarital relationships remained “irresponsible,” but “hapless children” 
should be protected from their most oppressive legal consequences.198 
 
 193. Id. at 173. 
 194. Id. Wilkinson’s first draft called this a “sacred and venerable state concern.” Wilkinson, 
First Draft of Weber v. Aetna Opinion, supra note 188, at 11. 
 195. Weber, 403 U.S. at 173. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 175–76. 
 198. Id. at 174, 176. Rehnquist’s dissent did not attract the votes of any of his colleagues, not 
even Stewart, the only surviving dissenter from Levy and Glona. Id. at 177. It did succeed in 
provoking Wilkinson’s ire. Rehnquist accused the majority of infidelity to its recent decision in 
Dandridge to uphold Maryland’s cap on welfare benefits for large families against an equal protection 
challenge. Id. at 184. Wilkinson fumed that Rehnquist “should hardly be so pious about precedent” 
given that his dissent “by implication . . . casts a major shadow over most of this Court’s equal 
protection work in the last decade and a half.” Memorandum from J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, to Justice 
Powell, Weber (Apr. 14, 1972), at 2, collected in Powell Papers, Weber v. Aetna file. Wilkinson 
drafted a footnote for Powell, which would have replied to Rehnquist’s criticism but in so doing, 
strongly implied that something more than rational basis review applied to illegitimacy-based 
classifications. See id. In the interest of “leav[ing] [Powell] flexible and uncommitted” on the 
appropriate standard of review, and recognizing disagreement among the majority Justices about the 
proper level of scrutiny, Wilkinson ultimately recommended that Powell let Rehnquist’s critique go 
unanswered. See id. 
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Weber’s focus on the injustice visited upon innocent children may have 
been over-determined, but it was not inevitable. Child-focused arguments 
dominated the ACLU’s brief in Weber to an unprecedented extent.199 True, the 
briefs in illegitimacy cases from Levy on barely mentioned the impact of 
illegitimacy penalties on the parents of nonmarital children, other than to cast 
aspersions on the power of these laws to deter nonmarital sex. But Douglas’s 
Glona opinion had left the door open to parents’ claims. Some commentaries, 
including the widely cited Gray and Rudovsky article, suggested more 
capacious interpretations of Glona and Levy that encompassed the rights of 
adults as well as children and emphasized the illegitimacy cases’ potential to 
expand the doctrine of sexual privacy.200 
Further, the Court was beginning to reconsider the rights of unmarried 
couples and parents in the early 1970s. Just a few weeks before Weber (but 
without Powell or Rehnquist’s participation), the Court validated Peter 
Stanley’s challenge to an Illinois policy denying fathers custody of their 
nonmarital children without so much as a hearing.201 In Stanley, Justice White 
quoted Levy and Glona as he declared that the law had not “refused to 
recognize those family relationships unlegitimized by a marriage ceremony,” 
and that “natural, but illegitimate, children . . . cannot be denied the right of 
other children because familial bonds in such cases were often as warm, 
enduring, and important as those arising within a more formally organized 
family unit.”202 Many hoped (or feared) that Stanley portended a new era for 
nonmarital parenthood. Eisenstadt v. Baird, too, seemed to bode well for the 
rights of the unmarried, as the Court extended constitutional protections for 
contraceptive use beyond the “sacred precincts of the marital bedroom”203 to 
include “the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from 
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a 
person as the decision whether or not to bear or beget a child.”204 
 
 199. Nor did the briefs for Weber press the point that illegitimacy-based classifications should 
be suspect and subject to strict scrutiny, although advocates would pick up and promote this argument 
again in future cases. It seems likely that Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall would have endorsed this 
position. White might have been a tougher sell, given his misgivings about the “basic civil rights” 
language in Levy—but he did join the Frontiero plurality to make sex suspect. Burger, Stewart, and 
Rehnquist would almost certainly not have embraced this position, and it seems highly unlikely that 
Blackmun would have, given his vote with the majority in Labine. 
 200. See supra notes 88–98 and accompanying text (discussing Gray & Rudovsky, supra note 
94); Dorsen & Rudovsky, supra note 97; see also Semmel, supra note 88, at 300–01 (suggesting that 
Glona might call into question the exclusion of unmarried mothers from Social Security “mother’s 
insurance” benefits). 
 201. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
 202. Id. at 651–52. 
 203. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). 
 204. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). The “sacred precincts of the marital 
bedroom” invoked by Douglas in Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479, gave way to Justice Brennan’s 
declaration that “the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but 
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Despite these promising contemporaneous developments, Powell’s 
account in Weber of the harm of illegitimacy classifications had enormous 
staying power: every pro-plaintiff illegitimacy decision thereafter quoted 
liberally from the opinion’s lament for “hapless” children.205 This focus on 
children and on means-ends rationality eclipsed the expansive visions of sexual 
privacy and autonomy offered by civil libertarians and welfare rights advocates 
in cases such as King v. Smith and in out-of-court writings questioning marital 
supremacy itself. 
The Court’s failure to discuss race in the early illegitimacy cases may 
have been a blessing in disguise: if the Court had relied on racially 
discriminatory impact or motive to invalidate illegitimacy-based classifications, 
its rulings might have been interpreted to require such discriminatory intent or 
effect in order to warrant constitutional scrutiny. Indeed, some commentators 
speculated that the unmentioned racial and socioeconomic subtext served to 
deepen the Justices’ sympathy for plaintiffs in these early cases.206 Further, a 
recognition of illegitimacy penalties’ disparate impact on people of color and 
the poor would have been compatible with a child-focused rationale that did 
not extend meaningful protection to unmarried adults or parents. 
But the Court’s failure to adopt advocates’ arguments about sexual 
privacy and autonomy, the harms illegitimacy penalties visited on parents as 
well as children, and the constitutionally questionable government interest in 
privileging formal marriage and traditional family structure had far reaching 
detrimental consequences. Advocates’ accounts of the constitutional harm of 
illegitimacy penalties posed a more profound challenge to the race and class-
inflected structural inequalities marital supremacy sustained. And as the next 
Part demonstrates, once arguments about illegitimacy penalties’ reinforcement 
of class- and race-based oppression fused with the feminist imperative to 
challenge women’s subordination, the impact of illegitimacy penalties on 
adults and the true costs of marital supremacy were thrown into stark relief. 
II. 
“AN INDEPENDENT JUSTIFICATION FOR THE ABOLITION OF ILLEGITIMACY”: 
THE RISE AND FALL OF FEMINIST ARGUMENTS, 1972–1979 
Seen from the perspective of Willie Mae Weber or Lou Bertha Labine, the 
illegitimacy cases were about more than a denial of rights to hapless and 
 
an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup.” Eisenstadt, 
405 U.S. at 453. 
 205. See, e.g., Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973); N.J. Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 
411 U.S. 619, 620 (1973) (per curiam); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 632 (1974); Trimble v. 
Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769–70 (1977). 
 206. See, e.g., John T. Noonan, Jr., The Family and the Supreme Court, 23 CATH. U. L. REV. 
255, 260 (1973) (“Lines drawn on the basis of legitimacy could be viewed as a sophisticated form of 
racial discrimination. The Court could have felt that it realistically extended the constitutional 
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innocent children. Rita Vincent’s inability to inherit from her father and the 
Weber children’s lack of access to Henry Stokes’s workers’ compensation 
benefits left their mothers on their own to fend for themselves and their 
children. Whether or not limiting sources of support for nonmarital children 
effectively deterred illicit sexual relationships—the focus of inquiry in the early 
illegitimacy cases—denials of benefits or inheritance on the basis of 
illegitimacy burdened their mothers at least as much as the children themselves. 
By the early 1970s, with new constitutional weapons in hand, some 
feminists and anti-poverty lawyers challenged the child-centered focus of 
illegitimacy litigation. The unfairness of holding mothers solely responsible for 
their illegitimate children’s support had troubled feminists of earlier eras.207 
But it was not until the late 1960s that courts began seriously to question the 
constitutionality of laws that treated women and men differently. In Reed v. 
Reed (1971), the Supreme Court ruled an Idaho statute preferring male estate 
administrators unconstitutional;208 eighteen months later, in Frontiero v. 
Richardson (1973), the Court struck down a provision requiring military 
servicewomen to prove their husbands’ dependence in order to receive spousal 
housing and medical benefits automatically available to servicemen and their 
wives.209 And in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld (1975), Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
successfully argued that denying Social Security “mothers’ insurance” benefits 
to widowed fathers unconstitutionally devalued their wives’ earnings.210 
Around the same time, feminists began to reframe illegitimacy penalties 
as injurious to women as well as to children.211 Like the earlier sexual 
libertarian arguments, the broadest feminist critiques of illegitimacy penalties 
emerged outside the courtroom. In the early 1970s, for instance, Aleta Wallach 
and Patricia Tenoso attacked the dominant child-focused campaign against 
illegitimacy laws head-on.212 The “legal literature,” they wrote in 1974, was 
“replete with expressions of concern for the ‘innocent’ child,” ignoring the 
impact of illegitimacy penalties on women and on “the family unit as a 
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whole.”213 This approach ignored “an independent justification for abolition of 
illegitimacy: the right of women to self-determination requires that they be free 
from all forms of male domination.”214 Wallach and Tenoso sought to unsettle 
the patriarchal nuclear family ideal and empower women as independent 
economic, social, and sexual actors untethered to men. 
Feminists like Wallach and Tenoso criticized anti-illegitimacy campaigns 
that took for granted the inherent undesirability of nonmarital childbearing. 
“Illegitimacy,” they argued, was a “problem” primarily because law and social 
norms made it so.215 Patriarchy and poverty were the true culprits. On this 
view, Harry Krause’s proposed Uniform Legitimacy Act “merely substitute[d] 
paternity for marriage as the basis for classifying children.”216 Krause’s 
relentless focus on ascertaining paternity reflected his “implicit assumption that 
only the male can or should support a family.”217 As a result, Krause failed to 
“treat the mother as an economic resource” by “eliminat[ing] the barriers to her 
employment.”218 Nor did he consider alternatives to paternal support—namely 
“adequate governmental support of all unmarried mothers and their 
children.”219 For these feminists, privileging marriage and privatizing 
dependency through paternity impaired women’s sexual and economic 
autonomy and ensured women’s subordination to men in both the private realm 
of family and the public world of the market and political life.220 
Hardly a trace of this full-throated feminist attack on marital supremacy, 
sex inequality, and sexual repression appeared in the dozen-odd illegitimacy 
opinions issued by the Supreme Court in the 1970s. Yet in many of these cases, 
advocates did translate some of the feminist critique into constitutional 
arguments. These challenges never coalesced into a grand strategy of the sort 
that propelled racial desegregation campaigns, and, to a lesser extent, 
Ginsburg’s sex equality litigation. Still, feminist-inflected arguments were 
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made powerfully, albeit sporadically, in the 1970s illegitimacy cases. But the 
child-focused rationale for questioning illegitimacy penalties proved 
remarkably resilient, with lasting consequences for sex equality, racial justice, 
and marital supremacy. 
In the 1970s, feminists initiated or joined challenges to an array of anti-
illegitimacy laws and policies, including the exemption of nonmarital fathers 
from liability for child support; limitations on illegitimate children’s ability to 
inherit from their fathers; laws requiring mothers to disclose their children’s 
paternity or face penalties including loss of public assistance, fines, and 
incarceration; employment bans on the parents of illegitimate children; and the 
exclusion of illegitimate children and their parents from various federal 
government benefits. As Section I.A describes, feminist arguments emphasized 
how these laws imposed a disproportionate economic and social burden on 
women, especially poor women of color; curtailed women’s sexual autonomy 
and invaded their privacy; and infringed upon women’s freedom to choose to 
bear children. Feminists defended unmarried mothers against charges of sin 
and selfishness, lauding their courage, independence, strength of character, and 
devotion to their children. Section I.B takes a brief detour to consider the 
Social Security Act cases, a rare instance in which sex equality claims did not 
surface. Finally, Section I.C describes how the Court circumvented feminist 
arguments against illegitimacy penalties, selectively embracing child-focused 
arguments and sidestepping or rejecting sex discrimination claims against these 
laws and policies.221 
A. “Designed to Subordinate Females”: Feminist Arguments Against 
Illegitimacy Penalties 
Linda Gomez believed Francisco Perez when he told her he was not 
married. They met at a party and began dating. Perhaps she thought he would 
someday be her husband when she became pregnant with his child. Certainly 
she might have thought he would be responsible for supporting their daughter. 
She would have been wrong on all counts. Perez, it turned out, was married to 
another woman and had no intention of marrying Linda or of supporting their 
daughter Zoraida. And under Texas statutory and common law, Linda and 
Zoraida had no remedy: state courts had long held that fathers were not liable 
for supporting their illegitimate children.222   
 
 221. For the purposes of this Essay, I use the term “feminist” to describe arguments that 
emphasized how illegitimacy penalties perpetuated women’s subordination. This Part briefly discusses 
nonmarital fathers’ claims of sex discrimination to the extent that they illuminate the feminist 
arguments that are this Essay’s primary subject. There is much more to be said about nonmarital 
fathers and feminists’ ambivalence about their constitutional claims to parental rights; I pursue that 
topic in depth elsewhere. See Serena Mayeri, Foundling Fathers: (Non-)Marriage and Parental Rights 
in the Age of Equality, 125 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2016). 
 222. Texas was an outlier in this regard; by the late 1960s, other holdouts had enacted or 
revised their support statutes to include “natural” fathers. KRAUSE, supra note 20, at 22. 
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Plaintiffs in Gomez v. Perez, one of two Texas child support cases to 
reach the U.S. Supreme Court in the early 1970s, pioneered the argument that 
placing the full burden of economic support for nonmarital children on mothers 
violated equal protection. Legal aid attorneys representing Linda Gomez wrote 
in their brief to the Supreme Court in 1972: “Equally as onerous as the State’s 
discrimination against the illegitimate child is its invidious scheme to place the 
entire burden of supporting such child on the female parent. To extoll the 
virtues of motherhood but be blind to its toils may be fact, but should it be 
law?”223 Linda R.S., challenging the exclusion of nonmarital fathers from 
liability under Texas’s criminal non-support statute, similarly emphasized the 
economic hardship imposed on mothers of nonmarital children while fathers 
escaped scot-free. Although “employed full time,” Linda had “very little 
money,” and according to federal court papers filed in 1970, could not maintain 
her daughter “in a manner equal to the opportunities and privileges of a 
comparably situated ‘father-supported’ child.”224 
Plaintiffs elaborated the economic burden argument in challenges to laws 
that limited nonmarital children’s ability to inherit from their intestate fathers, 
including in the leading Supreme Court case, Trimble v. Gordon. In 1974, 
twenty-eight-year-old Sherman Gordon of Chicago died suddenly, “the victim 
of a homicide.”225 He left no spouse and one child, four-year-old Deta Mona 
Trimble. Under Illinois law, Gordon’s parents and siblings stood to inherit his 
estate—an almost-new Plymouth automobile worth about $2,500—even 
though Gordon had been adjudicated Deta Mona’s father and held liable for 
child support while he lived.226 Gordon had lived with Deta Mona and her 
mother, Jessie, until his death: Ms. Trimble described Gordon to the Probate 
Court as her “common law husband” but she understood that “that don’t 
count.”227 
The same year, in Fernandez v. Shapp, Philadelphia’s Community Legal 
Services collaborated with feminist lawyer Ann Freedman of the Women’s 
Law Project to bring a federal class action lawsuit challenging Pennsylvania’s 
inheritance laws. The state’s intestate succession law precluded children born 
“out of wedlock” from inheriting from their fathers, and vice-versa.228 When 
fathers bequeathed property to their illegitimate children, those children paid a 
 
 223. Brief for Appellant at 20, Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (No. 71-575), 1972 WL 
136247. 
 224. Appendix at 11, Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973) (No. 71-6078) (Stipulated 
Statement of Fact). 
 225. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 764 (1977). 
 226. Id. Deta Mona would have inherited her father’s estate in full had she been legitimate. 
 227. Record of Proceedings in Trial Court, In re Gordon, No. 74 P 5902 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook 
Cnty. Probate), reprinted in Appendix at 16, 19, Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (No. 75-5952). 
Illinois had abolished common law marriage in 1905. 
 228. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment 
at 10, No. 74-2959, Fernandez v. Shapp (E.D. Pa. 1976), collected in Dorsen Papers, Box 34, Folder 
11 (describing 20 Pa. Stat. § 2107; 72 Pa. Stat. §§ 2485-403, -404 (Supp. 1975)). 
2015] THE NONMARITAL FAMILY 1315 
higher tax on the inheritance.229 Children and mothers, by contrast, could 
inherit from one another regardless of legitimacy or intestacy and paid no extra 
inheritance tax.230 
Both Fernandez and Trimble highlighted that, by limiting the paternal 
inheritance rights of nonmarital children, the law placed an unfair economic 
burden on mothers. “When one parent dies, the surviving parent obviously 
retains the duty of support and maintenance of the child as a legal matter,” 
Freedman and her colleagues wrote, “and as a practical matter, the burden . . . 
becomes greater because it is no longer shared.”231 Moreover, mothers suffered 
a “clear economic disadvantage” compared with surviving fathers, a 
disadvantage exacerbated by the inheritance laws.232 “[T]he child’s mother, as 
sole surviving parent, is burdened with the far more onerous task of supporting 
a child who has no claim against his or her father’s estate . . . requiring [the 
mother] to replace the support previously provided by the father.”233 
Like feminists of earlier eras who decried sexual double standards, 
advocates also highlighted how illegitimacy classifications shamed and 
penalized sexually active unmarried women while allowing men to engage in 
nonmarital sex and procreation with impunity. Lois Fernandez, an African 
American single mother of two, a Philadelphia community activist, and a 
plaintiff in Fernandez v. Shapp, later recalled: “[T]he thing that bothered me 
the most was that . . . [t]he question of the fathers never came up. . . . [T]here 
were the mothers, who were considered ‘whores,’ or ‘illicit women,’ and then 
there were the children, who were considered ‘bastards,’ ‘illegit.’ I just 
couldn’t accept that.”234 Linda Gomez’s lawyers attributed Texas law’s “sexual 
discrimination” in child support liability to the “days of antiquity, when men 
were ‘free to sow their wild oats’ while society endowed women, the weaker 
sex, with the duty to remain chaste, or at least guard against the ‘accidents of 
love.’”235 Courts should ask, they contended, “what possible legitimate state 
interest is promoted by singling out the female partner to acts of sexual 
 
 229. See id. at 10–11. 
 230. See id. at 10. 
 231. Id. at 28. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id.; see also Brief of the Appellants at 56, Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (No. 
75-5952), 1976 WL 181301. 
 234. Fernandez later described her ensuing campaign to persuade lawmakers and judges to 
reconsider Pennsylvania’s illegitimacy laws. Lois Fernandez, Legitimate, COWBIRD (Nov. 26, 2013), 
http://cowbird.com/story/83078/Legitimate_By_Lois_Fernandez; see also Kendall Wilson, A 
Mother’s War on ‘Illegitimate,’ PHILA. TRIB., Dec. 9, 2003 (“During her crusade, she was constantly 
beating back the stereotype of unwed mothers—particularly Black unwed women in this situation—as 
‘whores gobbling up welfare.’”). 
 235. Brief for Appellant at 21, Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (No. 71-575), 1972 WL 
136247. 
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promiscuity [and] forcing her, and her alone, to bear the economic 
consequences.”236 
The most sophisticated version of this argument appeared in Katie Mae 
Andrews’s attack on a Mississippi school district’s ban on hiring unwed 
parents, filed in 1973.237 In Andrews v. Drew Municipal Separate School 
District, social psychologist Kenneth Clark (author of the “doll studies” cited in 
Brown)238 testified that the challenged rule was part of “a long history of 
discrimination against females on matters of sex and sexual behavior . . . 
designed to subordinate females to an essentially inferior role, which the power 
of our society is mobilized to reinforce.”239 An amicus brief from the ACLU 
Women’s Rights Project and Equal Rights Advocates condemned illegitimacy 
penalties as a historical pillar of women’s subordination, part of a “double 
standard of sexual morality” that visited harsh punishments for nonmarital sex 
on women alone.240 “The history of anti-illegitimacy measures,” the feminist 
groups declared, “is thematically linked to discrimination against women.”241 
Depriving women of any claim on fathers’ resources also infringed upon 
their reproductive freedom, advocates contended. For many women, the ability 
to exercise control over reproduction meant more than the right to use 
contraception or to terminate a pregnancy. Poor women, especially unmarried 
women of color, faced involuntary sterilization at the hands of doctors who 
took it upon themselves—often with explicit or tacit encouragement from 
government officials—to curb the fertility of populations considered burdens 
on the public fisc.242 For these women, some of whom had religious or moral 
 
 236. Id. at 20. 
 237. See generally Andrews v. Drew Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 371 F. Supp. 27 (N.D. Miss. 
1973), aff’d, 507 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 423 U.S. 820 (1975), cert. dismissed as 
improvidently granted, 425 U.S. 559 (1976). 
 238. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954). 
 239. MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE, supra note 12, at 151 (quoting Appendix at 188, Drew 
Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Andrews, 425 U.S. 559 (1976) (No. 74-1318)). 
 240. Brief for Equal Rights Advocates Inc. and ACLU as Amici Curiae at 9–11, Drew Mun. 
Separate Sch. Dist. v. Andrews, 425 U.S. 559 (No. 74-1318), 1974 WL 175944 (quotation marks 
omitted). 
 241. Id. at 5. (“The concept of “illegitimacy” has varied in its legal dimensions across cultures 
and eras . . . With this pervasive variability, one constant appears: where legal and moral authorities 
have punished the offspring of sexual intercourse occurring outside the bounds of approved 
relationships, those authorities have likewise punished the maternal biological parents of these 
children . . . .”); see also Brief for Respondents at 61, Drew Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Andrews, 425 
U.S. 559 (No. 74-1318), 1976 WL 194019 (“[The rule] penalizes the unwed mother who assumes 
responsibility for the care and nurturance of the child and ignores the abandoning father, effectively 
rewarding his irresponsibility.”). 
 242. On involuntary sterilization, see REBECCA KLUCHIN, FIT TO BE TIED: STERILIZATION 
AND REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS IN AMERICA, 1950–1980 (2009); JENNIFER NELSON, WOMEN OF COLOR 
AND THE REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2003); JOHANNA SCHOEN, CHOICE AND COERCION: 
BIRTH CONTROL, STERILIZATION, AND ABORTION IN PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE (2005); 
ALEXANDRA MINNA STERN, EUGENIC NATION: FAULTS AND FRONTIERS OF BETTER BREEDING IN 
AMERICA (2005); see also DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, 
AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY (1997). 
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objections to abortion,243 the private relationship between woman and 
physician elevated by Blackmun’s opinion in Roe v. Wade was often a site of 
coercion rather than cooperative counsel. 
Accordingly, Rhonda Copelon and Nancy Stearns, young feminist 
lawyers from the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) argued in Andrews 
that excluding unwed mothers from employment encouraged abortion, 
penalized women who chose to continue rather than terminate a pregnancy, and 
violated the reproductive liberty protected by Roe v. Wade.244 The appearance 
in court of civil rights icon Fannie Lou Hamer, a well-known victim of 
involuntary sterilization, poignantly drove home this point in a region where 
such procedures were common enough to be called “Mississippi 
appendectom[ies].”245 To exercise genuine reproductive freedom, Dallas 
attorney Windle Turley argued in Linda R.S. to judges who had recently 
considered Roe v. Wade, unmarried women must be able to draw on all 
possible sources of financial support lest they be denied meaningful 
reproductive choice.246 “Because of such state enforced economic hardship, 
[unmarried mothers in Texas] are not permitted to freely elect between keeping 
and rearing their child and the alternatives of placing that child for adoption or 
even having its birth aborted.”247 
Some illegitimacy penalties continued the tradition of invasively 
patrolling poor women’s personal lives by conditioning their livelihoods on 
disclosure. Invoking a right to privacy to challenge laws and practices that 
forced disclosure of intimate relationships, plaintiffs followed in the footsteps 
of Mrs. Sylvester Smith.248 Roe v. Norton, for instance, attacked a Connecticut 
statute that punished poor unmarried mothers’ failure to disclose the name of 
their children’s fathers with a contempt citation that carried a fine and up to one 
 
 243. Andrews testified, “God put us here on earth and if it came up to that I feel that we should 
have them, you know. If we try to get rid of it, as most people do, that’s killing it. Well, you know 
where we would wind up then.” MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE, supra note 12, at 156. 
 244. See generally id. at 145–67; Teachers: Discrimination Against Unwed Mothers, 3 
WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 28 (1975). As CCR lawyer Jan Goodman put it, “We are arguing that all 
women should have the freedom to choose . . . whatever the choice is, to bear the child or to abort.” 
MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE, supra note 12, at 155. 
 245. NELSON, supra note 242, at 68. Fannie Lou Hamer also personally opposed abortion. On 
Fannie Lou Hamer’s life, see CHANA KAI LEE, FOR FREEDOM’S SAKE: THE LIFE OF FANNIE LOU 
HAMER (1999); KAY MILLS, THIS LITTLE LIGHT OF MINE: THE LIFE OF FANNIE LOU HAMER (1994). 
 246. Plaintiff’s Complaint, Linda R.S. v. Richard D., Civ. No. 3-4336-B (N.D. Tex. Dec. 3, 
1970), reprinted in Appendix at 6–7, Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973) (No. 71-6078); 
see also Brief for Appellants at 10, Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (No. 71-6078). The three-
judge federal district court panel that heard Linda R.S. included Judge Sarah Hughes, who dissented 
from the panel’s denial of standing on child-focused grounds. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 335 F. 
Supp. 804, 808 (N.D. Tex. 1971) (Hughes, J., dissenting). 
 247. Plaintiff’s Complaint, supra note 246; see also id. at 7 (“Said statutes deprive unwed 
pregnant women and unwed mothers of their federal constitutional rights” under the Ninth and 
Fourteenth Amendments including “the fundamental right of all women to freely choose whether to 
bear children” and “whether to keep their children.”). 
 248. See supra Part I.C; see also PLECK, supra note 2, ch. 3; Solinger, supra note 109. 
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year in prison.249 The Connecticut law was part of the latest attempt by states to 
mandate that unmarried mothers whose families might be eligible for public 
assistance cooperate with government officials in establishing paternity.250 One 
mother, Rosalynn Carr, told the judge hearing her case: “I would consider it a 
gross intrusion on my privacy to have to give the [father’s] name.”251 The 
mothers’ brief to the Supreme Court stressed that “for a woman to appear in 
court, be examined and cross-examined as to the names of persons with whom 
she had sexual intercourse, their address and other identifying information, and 
other details of her past sexual conduct, is a humiliating and degrading 
experience.”252 
Plaintiffs also argued that illegitimacy penalties violated a broader right to 
decisional autonomy in matters related to sex, marriage, and family. Mothers 
who challenged mandatory paternity disclosure claimed the prerogative to 
make financial and interpersonal decisions for their families without state 
interference. They drew on the Griswold-Eisenstadt-Roe line of sexual privacy 
decisions, the recognition of some rights for unmarried fathers in Stanley v. 
Illinois, and a series of parental rights cases stretching back to the early part of 
the twentieth century.253 The Mississippi plaintiffs contended that banning 
unwed mothers from employment “infringes one of the most sacred and private 
aspects of the family relationship—that between parent and child—by literally 
conditioning employment on the abandonment of one’s child and thereby 
punishing the maintenance of the parent-child relationship.”254 
Though the Court had ignored advocates’ invitation in the early litigation 
to address illegitimacy penalties’ disparate impact on African Americans and 
 
 249. Roe v. Norton, 422 U.S. 391 (1975). Married mothers, of course, were not subjected to 
this indignity since their husbands’ paternity generally was presumed. For an in-depth study of Roe v. 
Norton and the underlying issues from a children’s rights perspective, see Stephen D. Sugarman, Roe 
v. Norton: Coerced Maternal Cooperation, in IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN: ADVOCACY, LAW 
REFORM, AND PUBLIC POLICY 365 (Robert H. Mnookin ed., 1985). For a contemporaneous critical 
perspective on the case, see Aviam Soifer, Parental Autonomy, Family Rights, and the Illegitimate: A 
Constitutional Commentary, 7 CONN. L. REV. 1 (1974). 
 250. As welfare policy advocate Elizabeth Wickenden wrote in an internal memo, “The mother 
is shamed, coerced, denied the dignity of her own judgment about the best interest of her child and 
ultimately runs the risk of imprisonment.” Elizabeth Wickenden, “Policy Background of Roe v. 
Norton,” Justine Wise Polier Papers [hereinafter Polier Papers], MC413, Box 138, Folder: Roe v. 
Norton—CDF (on file with the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University). 
 251. Appendix of Brief of Children of Appellants at 14a, Roe v. Norton, 422 U.S. 391 (No. 73-
6033). 
 252. Brief for Appellants at 50, Roe v. Norton, 422 U.S. 391 (No. 73-6033), 1974 WL 186122; 
see also Justine Wise Polier, Memo to File: April 24, 1974, Roe v. Norton, Polier Papers, Box 138, 
Folder: Roe v. Norton—CDF (listing as the first of several “serious constitutional issues” raised by the 
case the mother’s “right to remain silent,” her “right to privacy” and “her right to be protected from 
public humiliation”). Similarly, in the Mississippi teachers’ case, plaintiffs complained that school 
officials invasively “investigated” job applicants’ personal lives to uncover evidence of past 
nonmarital childbirth. See MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE, supra note 12, at 157. 
 253. See, e.g., Brief for Appellants, supra note 252. 
 254. Brief of Respondents at 36, Drew Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Andrews, 425 U.S. 559 
(1976) (No. 74-1318), 1976 WL 181168. 
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the poor, race discrimination arguments persisted in several subsequent 
cases.255 Race played an especially prominent role in Andrews, the Mississippi 
teachers’ case. All five applicants denied jobs were African American women, 
and as many as 40 percent of the Drew school district’s African American 
students were born to unmarried parents. Superintendent George F. Pettey 
presided over a school district that had mightily resisted desegregation; after 
most whites decamped to “segregation academies,” Drew’s student population 
was 80 percent black, but the number of white teachers and administrators rose. 
The school district’s attorney, Champ Terney, was segregationist Senator 
James O. Eastland’s son-in-law, and he called Ernest van den Haag, a 
prominent defender of racial segregation in the 1950s, to testify. Andrews’s 
attorney, twenty-four-year-old Charles Victor McTeer, an African American 
protégé of Morty Stavis at CCR, secured the testimony of civil rights paragons 
Kenneth Clark and Fannie Lou Hamer.256 
Cases that involved obvious and direct harm to unmarried mothers and 
did not foreground discriminatory impact on presumptively innocent children 
risked an unsympathetic reception. Many continued to believe it fair, or at least 
sound social policy, for women to shoulder the blame for exposing their 
children to the iniquity of illegitimate status and to the penury of paternal 
absence. For plaintiffs, these cases provided an opportunity to defend the moral 
character of mothers who bore sole responsibility for their children’s care, and 
to argue that unmarried mothers deserved social support, not condemnation. 
For instance, when the Drew, Mississippi, school district defended its 
policy as necessary to protect children from moral corruption and to stem the 
tide of “schoolgirl pregnancies,” Hamer and Mae Bertha Carter staunchly 
defended the integrity of Andrews and the other young women turned away by 
Superintendent Pettey.257 Mrs. Carter, the (married) mother of thirteen children 
 
 255. See, e.g., N.J. Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 349 F. Supp. 491 (D. N.J. 1971), aff’d, 411 
U.S. 619 (1973) (per curiam); Brief for Appellants at 30, Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) 
(No. 70-5064) (arguing that Texas’s allocation of AFDC and other welfare benefits discriminated 
against nonmarital families of color based on race and family status). The internal correspondence of 
advocates involved in Roe v. Norton emphasized how mandatory paternity disclosure for AFDC 
recipients disproportionately affected African American women and children. See, e.g., Wickenden, 
supra note 250. Lois Fernandez recalled her own mother’s skepticism that she could successfully 
challenge a “white man’s law.” See Fernandez, supra note 234. 
 256. See MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE, supra note 12, at 149–52. Andrews’s attorneys 
argued, inter alia, that the school district’s “illegitimacy rule constitutes a race-based classification, 
built upon the legacy of slavery, and discriminates against Black women and their children.” Brief of 
Respondents at 64, Drew Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Andrews, 425 U.S. 559 (No. 74-1318). They 
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adoption differential and the “illegitimate” birthrate in Sunflower County combined to yield “144 
Black identifiably illegitimate children for every one white child similarly situated.” Id. at 65. 
 257. See, e.g., Respondents at 24, 28, Drew Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Andrews, 425 U.S. 559 
(No. 74-1318) (summarizing Hamer’s testimony) (“She believed that the community had great respect 
for those young women who, after bearing children out of wedlock, returned to school to get an 
education or a better job, or otherwise sought gainful employment to avoid the welfare rolls. As an 
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who had almost singlehandedly integrated the Drew public schools, testified 
that she would be proud to see Ms. Andrews teach her children.258 
Hamer’s and Carter’s testimony valorized the plaintiffs’ efforts to lift 
themselves out of poverty and support their children on their own as evidence 
of strong character rather than moral delinquency. Hamer highlighted the 
catch-22 imposed by powerful whites on black families generally and black 
women in particular: single mothers were damned if they relied on stingy and 
stigmatized public assistance, and damned if they sought a decent living 
through employment in the public school system. “[W]hen you say we are 
lifting ourselves up and you tell us to get off of welfare, then when peoples try 
to go to school to get off of welfare to support themselves, this is another way 
of knocking them down.”259 Hamer’s testimony depicted Andrews and her 
compatriots as responsible citizens, eschewing public assistance in favor of 
employment and self-sufficiency. 
The challenge to Connecticut’s mandatory paternity disclosure law also 
sought to rehabilitate unmarried mothers, who stood accused of depriving 
children already marked by illegitimacy of paternal knowledge and support. 
“Why,” asked the Connecticut attorney general, “should a mother be permitted, 
by her inaction, to cast her child into the eternal caverns of illegitimacy[?]”260 
Federal district Judge M. Joseph Blumenfeld decried the “anguish suffered by 
illegitimate children denied the satisfaction of knowing their paternity,”261 
declaring the interests of “recalcitrant mother[s]”262 diametrically opposed to 
those of their “innocent children.”263 The statute, he wrote, “operates 
prophylactically against the adverse differential treatment which the unwed 
mothers would impose on their children” by withholding information about 
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 258. See Appendix at 113–14, Drew Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Andrews, 425 U.S. 559 (No. 
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 259. Id. at 102. Andrews testified that she had taken a factory job in a nearby town that paid 
significantly less than a teacher’s aide salary in order to provide for her son. When Rogers lost her job 
because of Pettey’s rule, she “was thereby forced onto the welfare rol[l]s in order to provide for her 
child.” Brief for Respondents at 5, Drew Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Andrews, 425 U.S. 559 (No. 74-
1318), 1976 WL 194019. Hamer also vigorously disputed the notion that sexual behavior varied by 
race. Appendix, supra note 258, at 103. She had worked for white families all her life, Hamer said, and 
knew nonmarital sex to be at least as common among them. Id. Clark, too, took pains to emphasize the 
moral neutrality of sexual activity and rejected any connection between nonmarital childbearing and 
lower moral standards. “[U]nwed parenthood reflects the inability or lack of knowledge . . . as to how 
to avoid unwed parenthood, if it is undesired,” he stated in his deposition. Id. at 192. 
 260. Brief of the Appellee at 10, Roe v. Norton, 422 U.S. 391 (1975) (No. 73-6033), 1974 WL 
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 262. 365 F. Supp. at 72. 
 263. Id. at 79 n.23. 
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their fathers and depriving them of their best possible source of financial 
support.264 
The plaintiffs in Roe v. Norton, represented by Frank Cochran of the 
Connecticut Civil Liberties Union (CCLU), objected strongly to these assaults 
on mothers’ character. The stringent sanctions imposed for noncompliance 
produced a record replete with poignant testimony from women who feared 
that disclosing fathers’ identities would have devastating consequences. Some 
mothers recounted how fathers had threatened physical harm to them and their 
children if their identities were revealed. Others worried that fathers who had 
taken a voluntary interest in their children would skip town forever if found 
legally liable for child support. Some women had moved on to new 
relationships and feared that disclosure would jeopardize their plans for 
marriage and adoption by a new stepfather.265 
Cochran also secured the testimony of child welfare experts to counter the 
state’s contention that paternity disclosure always served nonmarital children’s 
best interests. They testified that forcing an unwilling mother to identify her 
child’s father would cause material and psychological harm to the child that 
would rarely, if ever, be outweighed by the often illusory promise of financial 
or psychic benefits from establishing paternity.266 And incarcerating a 
mother—usually the “primary” “psychological parent”—would be 
“catastrophic,” according to prominent pediatric psychiatrist Albert Solnit, co-
author of the influential Beyond the Best Interests of the Child.267 Moreover, he 
said, a mother, “the one who has the care and the responsibility and the loving 
affectionate bond” with a child, should be the one to determine the child’s best 
interests.268 Mothers, the plaintiffs argued, should be considered champions, 
not enemies, of their children’s well being.269 
By the mid-1970s, advocates could rely upon a growing complement of 
constitutional sex equality precedents to support their case against the sex 
discriminatory effects of illegitimacy penalties.270 To the extent that 
illegitimacy penalties could be framed as sex-based classifications, advocates 
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supra note 249, at 389–90. 
 266. See, e.g., Appendix, supra note 265, at 62–71 (deposition of Albert J. Solnit, M.D.). 
 267. Id. Children “cannot escape the devastating impact of the loss of the person who has taken 
care of them since they were born, helpless as an infant into this world,” Solnit testified. Id. at 66. 
 268. Id. at 67. 
 269. The plaintiffs’ lawyers did not, in the end, rely upon the expert testimony at trial. See 
Sugarman, supra note 249, at 391. 
 270. State Equal Rights Amendments served as additional ammunition in some cases: the 
Women’s Law Project’s Ann Freedman relied on Pennsylvania’s ERA as well as the federal Equal 
Protection Clause in Fernandez. See generally Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Cross-
Motion for Summary Judgment, No. 74-2959, Fernandez v. Shapp (E.D. Pa. 1976), collected in 
Dorsen Papers, Box 34, Folder 11. 
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used the Reed/Frontiero line of cases to invoke heightened scrutiny of the 
relationship between means and ends. And the disparate impact on women of 
restricting the employment of parents of nonmarital children called such 
policies into question under both statutory and constitutional precedents. As 
Texas federal district court Judge Sarah T. Hughes concluded in her 1971 
decision holding a bank’s ban on hiring unmarried parents unlawful under Title 
VII, “it is common knowledge that it is easier to determine if a woman has 
illegitimate children than men.”271 Arguments of this kind loomed large in 
Andrews, where the employment ban ostensibly excluded all unmarried 
parents—but Superintendent Pettey himself admitted that his rule did not affect 
unwed fathers.272 When it came to pregnancy, women, not men, were, as he put 
it, “stuck with the result.”273 
Plaintiffs capitalized on recent feminist defeats as well as victories. The 
Supreme Court’s 1974 decision in Kahn v. Shevin274 (upholding a property tax 
exemption for widows against a sex discrimination challenge) frustrated 
advocates who saw in Kahn remnants of courts’ old patronizing attitude toward 
women. But Kahn also highlighted women’s economic disadvantage, 
especially after the death of the men on whom they depended for financial 
support. “There can be no dispute,” Justice Douglas wrote for the Kahn 
majority, “that the financial difficulties confronting the lone woman . . . exceed 
those facing the man. . . . [T]he job market is inhospitable to the woman 
seeking any but the lowest paid jobs.”275 In Kahn, the “lone woman” in 
question was a presumably elderly widow whose marital bargain of financial 
support in exchange for family care had been disrupted through no fault of her 
own. In intestacy cases such as Fernandez and Trimble, the plaintiffs argued 
that women who had never married—and quite possibly had never depended 
upon their children’s fathers for financial support—should benefit from the 
same principle. Thus, the intestacy plaintiffs implicitly challenged the 
privileged position widows held by virtue of marriage. 
Then, in 1975, Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld provided a precedent that 
seemed tailor-made for challenging sex discriminatory illegitimacy 
 
 271. DARWIN PAYNE, INDOMITABLE SARAH: THE LIFE OF JUDGE SARAH T. HUGHES 299 
(2004) (quoting Sarah T. Hughes) (citations omitted). For more on early cases challenging bans on 
unmarried mothers’ employment, see MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE, supra note 12, ch. 5; Serena 
Mayeri, Intersectionality and Title VII: A Brief (Pre-)History, 95 B.U. L. REV. 713 (2015). 
 272. Appendix at 39, Drew Mun. Separate Sch. Dist. v. Andrews, 425 U.S. 559 (1976) (No. 74-
1318). When asked how she knew that the only male teacher’s aide in the elementary school did not 
have any illegitimate children, the official who had turned Andrews away replied, “He is married.” Id. 
at 55. 
 273. Id. at 39. 
 274. 416 U.S. 351 (1974). 
 275. Id. at 353; see also Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law, supra note 228, at 29 (“[H]ere, in an 
analogous situation, the statute is doing the opposite of what was approved in Kahn.” (emphasis in 
original) (citation omitted)). 
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classifications.276 The exclusion of widowers and their children from Social 
Security survivors’ benefits available to widows, Justice Brennan wrote, 
“discriminates among surviving children solely on the basis of the sex of the 
surviving parent.”277 So, argued plaintiffs’ lawyers, did many state intestacy 
laws.278 By the mid-1970s, sex equality arguments seemed among the most 
potent weapons against the only remaining negative precedent, Labine v. 
Vincent. But these arguments were conspicuously absent from the challenges to 
illegitimacy classifications in the Social Security Act that reached the Court in 
the mid-1970s. The next Section briefly considers these cases before describing 
the fate of feminist and other arguments against illegitimacy penalties in the 
Supreme Court. 
B. “Promoting Equality Between Illegitimate and Legitimate Children”: The 
Social Security Cases 
Frontiero and Wiesenfeld came too late to be helpful to Ramon Jimenez 
and his attorneys. Ramon Jimenez and Elizabeth Hernandez had lived together 
in Chicago with their three children.279 When Hernandez left the family in 
1968, Jimenez found himself caring for a five-year-old, a three-year-old, and an 
infant alone.280 Disabled since 1963, Jimenez had previously claimed Social 
Security benefits for his legal wife, Filomena, and their five children, all of 
whom remained in Jimenez’s native Puerto Rico.281 But when Jimenez applied 
for benefits on behalf of the three nonmarital children he had lived with and 
supported from birth, he discovered that only the eldest, Magdalena, was 
eligible.282 Puzzled, Jimenez sought counsel from the Chicago Legal 
Assistance Foundation.283 Illegitimate children, they discovered, could only 
receive insurance benefits if they were born prior to the onset of the wage-
earner’s disability.284 In contrast, “[a]fter-born” legitimate children—regardless 
of whether they lived with or were supported by their wage-earning parent—
were automatically eligible for benefits.285 In Illinois, the only way to 
 
 276. 420 U.S. 636 (1975). 
 277. Id. at 651. Quoting Stanley, he declared: “[A] father, no less than a mother, has a 
constitutionally protected right to the ‘companionship, care, custody, and management’ of ‘the 
children he has sired and raised.’” Id. at 652. 
 278. Reed v. Reed proved invaluable to plaintiffs in the intestacy cases for strategic as well as 
substantive reasons. See Telephone Interview with James Weill and Jane Greengold Stevens (Aug. 6, 
2013). 
      279.     Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 630 (1974). 
      280.     Id. 
      281.     Interview with Jane Greengold Stevens, in New York, N.Y. (June 19, 2013). 
      282.     Id. 
      283.     Id. 
      284.     Id. 
      285.     Id.; Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 634–36 (1974). 
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legitimate a child was for the parents to marry each other, not a practical option 
for Ramon Jimenez.286 
To Jimenez’s attorney Jane Greengold Stevens, the statute seemed 
“blatantly unfair” to nonmarital children, who were powerless to change their 
parents’ marital status.287 Though their claim was an “everyday” matter, far 
from a carefully selected test case, Stevens later realized that Ramon Jimenez 
and his children were “a poster family for promoting equality between 
legitimate and illegitimate children,” since Ramon had lived with the children 
their whole lives and indeed had become their sole source of support and 
care.288 The government’s concern about collusive or fraudulent claims of 
paternity might have been warranted in cases involving an absent or delinquent 
father, but Jimenez was neither. 
In hindsight, Jimenez was a possible but hardly an obvious vehicle for a 
sex discrimination claim. The overall statutory scheme, by limiting the 
circumstances under which illegitimate children were eligible for benefits, left 
many women in the lurch—arguably a disparate impact.289 But in Jimenez, the 
mother had left the family. And unlike the child support cases, where paternal 
non-support obviously burdened mothers and absolved fathers, the 
discrimination challenged in Jimenez affected both men and women. In any 
event, Stevens, though an ardent feminist, simply did not see Jimenez as a sex 
discrimination case. She later recalled approaching the problem of illegitimacy-
based classifications as an anti-poverty lawyer primarily concerned with the 
welfare of children.290 
Mathews v. Lucas, like Jimenez, involved an illegitimacy-based 
classification in the federal Social Security Act, denying survivors’ benefits to 
certain illegitimate children who could not prove they were dependent upon 
their father at the time of his death. Unlike Jimenez, though, the facts in 
Mathews v. Lucas arguably lent themselves to a sex discrimination claim.291 
Belmira Lucas had lived in Providence with Robert Cuffee for approximately 
twenty years, and borne him two children, Darin and Ruby.292 Lucas despaired 
of divorcing her legal spouse, Raymond Lucas, because of his severe 
 
 286. Interview with Jane Greengold Stevens, supra note 281. 
 287. Telephone Interview with John Henry Schlegel (March 22, 2013); Interview with Jane 
Greengold Stevens, supra note 281. 
 288. Interview with Jane Greengold Stevens, supra note 281. 
 289. As Herbert Semmel explained in 1969, “At present, when illegitimate children do not 
qualify for Social Security benefits it is usually because their claim is based on the eligibility and 
earnings of their father. . . . [M]ost illegitimates can qualify for children’s benefits based on their 
mother’s account. However, a mother may have insufficient quarters of covered earnings to qualify 
either herself or the child for benefits or she may have a lower earning base than the father . . . . In 
many cases, the father dies, becomes disabled or retires before the mother’s status entitles the child to 
benefits.” Semmel, supra note 88, at 294. 
 290. Interview with Jane Greengold Stevens, supra note 281. 
 291. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976). 
 292. Appendix at 10, Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (No. 75-88). 
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disabilities.293 Lucas therefore had trouble proving that her relationship with 
Cuffee was a valid common law marriage under Rhode Island law,294 though 
she testified that Cuffee gave her a ring symbolizing their marriage in 1950, 
four years after they began living together.295 Robert supported Darin and 
Ruby, and they called him Daddy.296 But when Raymond died in 1965, 
Belmira did not marry Robert—perhaps out of embarrassment at having lived 
so long out of wedlock, as she told the court,297 or perhaps because of Robert’s 
drinking and violent behavior, which led their relationship to dissolve shortly 
thereafter.298 
Robert left to live with his mother in 1966; Belmira testified that he saw 
the children two or three times per week and gave Ruby money from his 
mother and aunt while he was unable to work.299 In the meantime, Belmira was 
providing most of her family’s support, working for the local electric company. 
When Robert died in 1968, Darin and Ruby were not eligible for survivors’ 
benefits because they could not prove that they were dependent upon Robert at 
the time of his death. This result left Belmira Lucas high and dry—not in spite 
of the fact that she had been the primary breadwinner during the final years of 
Robert’s life, but because their children had depended upon her and not him.300 
Even so, as in Jimenez there was no sex-based distinction apparent on the face 
of the statute—only arguably a disparate impact on women—and so it is 
perhaps unsurprising that the Lucas’ attorneys did not argue sex discrimination. 
But in their omission of sex equality arguments, the Social Security cases were 
the exception in 1970s illegitimacy litigation rather than the rule.301 
C. “The Risks All Seem to Be on Her Side”: Failure in the Supreme Court 
None of the feminist-inflected arguments explored in Section II.A 
penetrated Supreme Court opinions. Court victories for illegitimacy plaintiffs 
relied on Weber’s child-focused rationale. Several cases with explicitly 
feminist framings settled or were rendered effectively moot by statutory and 
 
 293. See id. at 51. 
 294. Id. at 32 (describing relationship as “common law union” and explaining that the couple 
did not marry because “she was not free to marry”); see also id. at 66–70 (administrative law judge’s 
ruling against recognizing common law marriage). 
 295. Id. at 48. 
 296. Id. at 27. 
 297. Id. at 61. 
 298. See id. at 49. 
 299. Id. at 11–14, 26–27. 
 300. Another challenge to the same provision featured a sixteen-year-old father and a fourteen-
year-old mother; the young parents had lived with their parents, and the father had never supported the 
child because he left to serve in Vietnam, where he was killed at nineteen. See Norton v. Mathews, 427 
U.S. 524 (1976). 
 301. And by the time she became involved in her second and third illegitimacy cases (Trimble 
and Lalli, both intestacy cases), sex equality arguments were a regular part of Jane Greengold 
Stevens’s repertoire. 
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regulatory developments. And the 1970s ended with a series of disheartening 
defeats for illegitimacy plaintiffs. 
1. Weber Redux, 1973–1977 
Despite the prominent place of sex equality claims in the Texas child 
support cases, child-focused arguments again prevailed. Justice Byron White 
wrote a short per curiam opinion in Gomez v. Perez (1973), holding that to 
“den[y] such an essential right” as child support “to a child simply because its 
natural father has not married its mother” was “illogical and unjust.”302 
In Trimble v. Gordon (1977), the Justices’ internal debates focused 
primarily on the wisdom of overturning Labine.303 Clerk Gene Comey advised 
Powell to “hit Labine where it really hurts: the statement that the social 
difference between a wife and a concubine is analogous to the social difference 
between a legitimate and an illegitimate child. It may be,” wrote Comey, “that 
the state has the power to say that the wife takes property and the concubine 
does not. It cannot be said that such a rule is illogical or unjust . . . [it] has some 
relationship to individual responsibility. But with respect to illegitimate 
children, the opposite is true.”304 Powell’s majority opinion borrowed heavily 
from Weber, and reflected Comey’s suggested reasoning: “The parents have 
the ability to conform their conduct to societal norms, but their illegitimate 
children can affect neither their parents’ conduct nor their own status.”305 The 
five-to-four decision confirmed the child-focused account of illegitimacy 
penalties’ harm and sidestepped the sex discrimination question altogether.306 
 
 302. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (per curiam) (quotations excluded); see also 
N.J. Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973) (per curiam) (striking down a New Jersey law 
awarding benefits to families according to parents’ marital status). 
 303. Both Blackmun’s and Powell’s conference notes suggest that Trimble’s relationship to 
Labine was the focus of conference discussion. Blackmun correctly predicted that the Court would be 
“sadly split” in Trimble. He was wrong, however, about how Powell would vote. Contrary to 
Blackmun’s forecast that Powell would join Burger, Stewart, and Rehnquist to affirm, Powell made 
clear at conference that he strongly disliked Labine and would reverse the Illinois court. Memorandum 
from Justice Blackmun, No. 75-5952, Trimble v. Gordon (Dec. 3, 1976), collected in Blackmun 
Papers, Box 249, Folder 5; see also LFP Conference Notes, Fiallo v. Levi, No. 75-6297, Dec. 10, 
1976, LFP Papers, at 39. 
 304. Bobtail Bench Memorandum from Gene Comey to Justice Powell, No. 75-5952, Trimble 
v. Gordon (Dec. 6, 1976), at 3, collected in Powell Papers. 
 305. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977). Four Justices dissented: Burger, Blackmun, 
and Stewart agreed with the Illinois Supreme Court that Labine—which all of them had joined—
should control. Stewart and Blackmun privately expressed misgivings about Labine. But Blackmun 
disliked Powell’s majority opinion, writing in the margin of one draft: “W[oul]d not join this opinion 
even if I agreed with the result.” Third Draft of Opinion for the Court in Trimble v. Gordon (Jan 24, 
1977), at 1, collected in Blackmun Papers, Box 249, Folder 5. 
 306. Trimble, 430 U.S. 762 at 766 (“As we conclude that the statutory discrimination against 
illegitimate children is unconstitutional, we do not reach the sex discrimination argument.”). The race 
discrimination question, Powell noted in a footnote, had been raised by the appellants below but was 
not before the Court. Id. at 765 n.10. 
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The most explicitly feminist illegitimacy cases never produced Supreme 
Court opinions. Fernandez v. Shapp, the challenge to Pennsylvania’s 
inheritance laws, settled shortly after Trimble was decided with an unpublished 
consent decree.307 The Justices used statutory and regulatory developments to 
avoid issuing opinions in Roe v. Norton, the mandatory paternity disclosure 
case, and Andrews, the unwed mothers’ employment case.308 
Then, in Mathews v. Lucas (1976), the Court interrupted a string of 
victories for plaintiffs with a ruling that upheld an illegitimacy classification in 
the Social Security Act.309 Ironically, Justice Blackmun’s opinion for the 
majority in Lucas gave feminists a backhanded boost at the expense of the 
campaign against illegitimacy penalties. Justifying the decision not to apply 
strict scrutiny, Blackmun wrote that “discrimination against illegitimates has 
never approached the severity or pervasiveness of the historic legal and 
political discrimination against women and Negroes.”310 The only references to 
sex discrimination in Lucas concerned the analogy—or lack thereof—between 
sex- and illegitimacy-based classifications. 
2. Making “the Most of a Bad Case”: Fiallo v. Bell and Lalli v. Lalli, 1977–
1978 
In Fiallo v. Bell, another illegitimacy case decided on the same day as 
Trimble in 1977, the sex discrimination issue was difficult to dodge, but the 
case was also difficult to win.311 Ramon Martin Fiallo was born in New York 
in 1971 to Ramon Fiallo-Sone and Celia Francisca Michel Rodriguez, natives 
of Guadeloupe who never married each other. Court papers described Ramon’s 
 
 307. See Adens ex rel. Green v. Schweiker, 773 F.2d 545, 547–48 (3d Cir. 1985) (noting that 
Pennsylvania’s discriminatory intestacy laws were “declared unconstitutional in a consent decree filed 
on May 30, 1978, Fernandez v. Shapp, No. 74-2959 (E.D. Pa. 1987)”). Lois Fernandez and her allies 
also successfully lobbied the Pennsylvania legislature to reform other state laws that discriminated 
against nonmarital children and their parents. See Stephen Franklin, Mother Wins Fight to End Stigma 
of Illegitimacy, BULLETIN (Philadelphia), Dec. 10, 1978, at 3; Pamela Smith, Lois Fernandez: Because 
of Her, There are No More ‘Illegitimate Children’ in Pennsylvania, PHILA. TRIB., Jan. 2, 1979, at 1. 
 308. Roe v. Norton was remanded in light of a statutory change. Sugarman concluded in 1985 
that Connecticut policy effectively remained the same as it was before the litigation. See Sugarman, 
supra note 249. The Court dismissed the writ of certiorari in Andrews as improvidently granted 
because of a regulatory change prohibiting marital status discrimination against public schoolteachers. 
For more, see MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE, supra note 12, at 162–65 (describing the Justices’ 
consideration of Andrews). In another contemporaneous case, the Third Circuit upheld a public 
library’s discharge of a Pennsylvania custodian and librarian for openly living together outside of 
marriage. Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 545 F.2d 382 (3d Cir. 1976). The Supreme Court 
denied the employees’ petition for certiorari over dissents from Justices Brennan and Marshall. See 
Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Pub. Library, 439 U.S. 1052, 1055 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting from 
denial of cert.) (“Petitioners’ rights to pursue an open rather than a clandestine personal relationship 
and to rear their child together in this environment closely resemble the other aspects of personal 
privacy to which we have extended constitutional protection.”). 
 309. 427 U.S. 495 (1976). 
 310. Id. at 506. 
 311. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977). 
1328 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  5:1277 
mother as the “bread-winner,” and his father as Ramon’s “primary caretaker 
and constant companion.”312 Ramon’s U.S. citizenship would have eased his 
father’s path to legal residency had his parents married. Moreover, regulations 
exempted mothers of illegitimate citizen children but not fathers from 
restrictive immigration quotas.313 Conversely, plaintiff Serge Warner, the West 
Indian-born son of U.S. citizen Cleophus Warner, could not bypass the quota 
system to become a permanent resident, as he could have done if his mother 
had been a citizen—or if his parents had been married.314 Plaintiff teenagers 
Trevor and Earl Wilson were permanent U.S. residents whose Jamaican father 
could not obtain a visa to move to the United States after the death of their 
mother in 1974, though a mother (or a “legitimate” father) could have done 
so.315 
Congress’s plenary power over immigration made challenging these sex- 
and illegitimacy-based classifications an uphill battle.316 Indeed, classifications 
considered far more offensive to the Constitution flourished in American 
immigration law, virtually untouched by the civil rights revolution.317 But the 
plaintiffs in Fiallo, their Legal Aid Society lawyers emphasized, included not 
merely “aliens” but U.S. citizens and permanent residents.318 They succeeded 
in persuading one of three judges, former civil rights lawyer Jack B. Weinstein, 
whose dissent proclaimed, 
Legal discrimination between men and women or legitimates and 
illegitimates with no rational basis is no longer tolerated. Where, as 
here, statutory invidious discrimination punishes American citizens by 
denying them familial association, one of the most precious attributes 
of humanity, the courts should say what is plain: the statute is 
unconstitutional.319 
 
 312. Appendix at 6, Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (No. 75-6297) (Amended Complaint – Class 
Action). 
 313. See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 789; see also Brief for Appellants at 9–11, Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 
787 (No. 75-6297). 
 314. See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 803–04; see also Brief for Appellants, supra note 313, at 7–9. 
 315. See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 790 n.3, 792 n.4; see also Brief for Appellants, supra note 313, at 
11–13. 
 316. On Fiallo and how the plenary power doctrine operated in the executive and legislative 
branches, see Kristin A. Collins, Plenary Power, Coordinate Branches, and Gender-Based Nationality 
Laws, in THE PUBLIC LAW OF GENDER: FROM THE LOCAL TO THE GLOBAL (Kim Rubenstein & 
Katharine G. Young eds.) (forthcoming 2016). 
 317. As two members of the three-judge district court empaneled to hear Fiallo wrote, 
“alien[s]” could “be denied entrance on grounds which would be constitutionally suspect or 
impermissible in the context of domestic policy, namely, race, physical condition, political beliefs, 
sexual proclivities, age, and national origin.” Fiallo v. Levi, 406 F. Supp. 162, 165 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), 
aff’d sub nom. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (internal citations omitted). For a fascinating 
historical perspective, see Collins, supra note 27. 
 318. See, e.g., Brief for Appellants at 6–7, Fiallo v. Bell, 406 F. Supp 162 (No. 75-6297), 1976 
WL 181344. 
 319. Fiallo, 406 F. Supp. at 169 (Weinstein, J., dissenting). 
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The Fiallo plaintiffs’ sex discrimination claim focused almost exclusively 
on discrimination against unwed fathers.320 They presented empirical studies 
demonstrating that unmarried fathers often had strong bonds with their 
children. They argued that the challenged regulations unconstitutionally 
“stereotyped” unwed fathers as uninvolved and uncaring when often—as in the 
plaintiffs’ cases—the opposite was true.321 In fact, the plaintiffs emphasized, 
out-of-wedlock pregnancies most often occurred as a result of “exclusive long-
term relationships between the mothers and the fathers.”322 
The regulations’ impact on mothers did not go unmentioned: in a 
footnote, the plaintiffs’ brief clarified that although the “primary sex 
discrimination imposed by the challenged provisions is against illegitimate 
children and their fathers,” the law “discriminate[d] against women as well.”323 
A citizen or permanent resident father could rest assured that if he could not 
care for his illegitimate citizen or permanent resident child, “that child can be 
united in this country with the other parent, the mother.”324 But a U.S. citizen 
or permanent resident mother “has no similar assurance . . . since the father is 
effectively barred from entering this country.”325 As a result, Trevor and Earl 
Wilson’s mother, Leony Moses, “could not be assured that upon her death her 
children would be supported and cared for in this country” by their surviving 
parent.326 
The footnote gave a tantalizing hint of a full-throated argument that the 
citizenship laws discriminated against mothers as well as fathers. Like Paula 
Wiesenfeld, whose Social Security benefits were worth less to her family than 
a husband’s would have been, Leony Moses’s U.S. citizenship did not 
guarantee her and her children the care of their “sole surviving parent.”327 
Indeed, it is not difficult to imagine Ruth Bader Ginsburg making such an 
argument, had she argued Fiallo. Ginsburg very much wanted to file an amicus 
brief, but despite her repeated entreaties and Norman Dorsen’s support, Legal 
Director Mel Wulf—author of the ACLU’s first constitutional analysis of 
illegitimacy classifications sixteen years earlier—rejected the idea, for reasons 
that are not entirely clear.328 The Fiallo plaintiffs’ sex discrimination argument 
remained limited to its detrimental effects on fathers.329 
 
 320. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 318, at 23–31. 
 321. See id. at 23–26. 
 322. Id. at 26. 
 323. Id. at 24, n.17. 
 324. Id. 
 325. Id. 
 326. Id. 
 327. The brief cited Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975). 
 328. See ACLU Memorandum to HEW, supra note 34. Janet Calvo was receptive to the idea as 
well. See Letters from Ruth Bader Ginsburg to Norman Dorsen & Mel Wulf (Dec. 4, 1975); Mel Wulf 
to Ruth Bader Ginsburg (Dec. 9, 1975); Janet M. Calvo to Ruth Bader Ginsburg (Dec. 12, 1975) (“We 
plan to appeal . . . and would welcome your participation as Amicus Curiae.”); Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
to Mel Wulf et al. (Dec. 17, 1975) (“Agree with Mel that this litigation is in good hands. However, 
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Many did see the distinctions between fathers and mothers in Fiallo as 
constitutionally problematic. Powell clerk J. Philip Jordan initially called them 
“totally arbitrary sex discrimination” and deemed the government’s concern 
that parents might bring unlimited numbers of illegitimate children to the 
United States “a bunch of crap!”330 But Congress’s plenary immigration power 
proved a formidable obstacle, leading Powell to observe that the Legal Aid 
Society’s brief made “the most of a bad case.”331 Blackmun agreed, and even 
Brennan and Marshall at first reluctantly joined the majority, before deciding to 
dissent.332 In the end, Powell wrote the majority opinion upholding the 
challenged provision.333 He apparently rejected clerk Gene Comey’s advice 
that he not refer to “the perceived absence in most cases of close family ties” 
between fathers and their nonmarital children as a rationale for the law.334 
Marshall’s dissenting opinion in Fiallo marked the first time that a Court 
opinion discussed a claim of sex discrimination in a case involving nonmarital 
families and illegitimacy-based classifications.335 Citing the sex equality cases, 
 
would very much like to do an amicus for the ACLU. . . . [I]f the Court is willing to entertain any 
breach, Fiallo seems the most sympatique case one could bring up.”); Norman Dorsen to Mel Wulf 
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initially assigned the majority opinion to Marshall. Marshall declined. Letter from Justice Marshall to 
Chief Justice Burger, Assignment of Opinion in Fiallo v. Levi (Dec. 13, 1976), collected in Powell 
Papers. 
 333. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 788 (1977). 
 334. See id. at 799. Comey recommended that Powell avoid endorsing the Government’s 
contention that “natural fathers and illegitimate children” were less likely to have a “strong interest in 
intimacy” than other parent-child pairings. Bobtail Bench Memorandum from Gene Comey, No. 75-
6297, Fiallo v. Levi (Dec. 6, 1976), at 4, collected in Powell Papers. Comey saw “no reason to rely on 
this somewhat ‘distasteful’ argument,” which contradicted the Court’s recent move toward “a position 
where legitimate and illegitimate families are generally considered to have a strong degree of family 
intimacy and unity.” Id. 
 335. In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), the plaintiff raised the issue of sex 
discrimination against fathers, but White’s opinion relied instead on concepts of due process. In 
Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974), and especially Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976), 
the plaintiffs could have, but did not, highlight how the challenged classifications disadvantaged 
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the illegitimacy cases, and the “fundamental ‘freedom of personal choice in 
matters of marriage and family life,’”336 Marshall condemned the challenged 
provisions. He credited the plaintiffs’ claim that the laws constituted “invidious 
discrimination” against unwed fathers and illegitimate children and infringed 
upon the parent-child relationship in ways foreclosed by decisions such as 
Stanley and Wiesenfeld.337 But Marshall’s dissent, too, framed the sex equality 
issue as a matter of discrimination against fathers, not mothers. 
The next illegitimacy case to reach the Court, Lalli v. Lalli, did not 
present the most auspicious facts for raising sex (or race) discrimination 
claims.338 Mario Lalli ran a publishing company that specialized in “dream 
books” for “bettors who play the numbers.”339 In January 1973, Lalli’s body 
was found riddled with bullets and wrapped in an awning in the Pelham Bay 
section of the Bronx. Several days later, thirty-year-old William Farrell was 
arrested for murder, a business dispute the apparent motive.340 
When he died, Mario was legally married to Rosamond Lalli but had lived 
with Eileen Lalli, the mother of at least two of his children, for many years, 
until Eileen’s death in 1968. When Mario and Eileen’s son Robert Lalli later 
requested an accounting of Mario’s estate in the hope of claiming an 
inheritance, the Surrogate’s Court turned him down.341 New York law required 
a court order of filiation during the father’s lifetime in order for a nonmarital 
child to participate in probate proceedings.342 While there was no question that 
Mario had acknowledged, lived with, and supported Robert and his late sister 
Maureen, the only documentary evidence Robert could produce were baptismal 
certificates and a document in which Mario gave his consent to his “son” 
Robert’s underage marriage.343 
In most of the earlier illegitimacy cases, advocates could frame the 
plaintiffs as devoted but impoverished mothers, fathers, and innocent children 
challenging laws motivated at least in part by disdain for illicit sex and 
 
women and men on the basis of sex. In Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973), Linda R.S. v. Richard 
D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973), Drew Municipal Separate School District v. Andrews, 425 U.S. 559 (1976), 
and Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977), plaintiffs and amici argued that the challenged 
illegitimacy-based classifications harmed women by burdening them with sole responsibility for the 
support of nonmarital children, but the Court declined to discuss sex discrimination on any terms. 
 336. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 810 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 337. Id. at 813. 
 338. 439 U.S. 259 (1978). 
 339. Son is Arrested in Slaying of ‘Dream Books’ Publisher, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1973, at 14. 
 340. Id. The Times reported that William was Mario’s “illegitimate” son, but Blackmun’s oral 
argument notes indicate that William was the son of Mario’s deceased nonmarital partner, Eileen, by 
another man. 
 341. Appendix at A-31 to A-32, Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (No. 77-1115) (Decree of 
Surrogate Evans V. Brewster); see also Lalli, 439 U.S. at 261–63. 
 342. See Lalli, 439 U.S. at 261–62. 
 343. See Appendix, supra note 341, at A-14 to A-17. Robert Lalli also introduced several 
affidavits supporting his claim that he and his sister had lived with, been acknowledged by, and 
received support from Mario Lalli. See id. at A-17 to A-28. 
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illegitimacy. With a deceased mother, an adult plaintiff, a relatively well-off 
and apparently dysfunctional family involved in an unsavory business, Lalli 
lacked a similarly sympathetic factual situation. In any event, the four Justices 
who dissented in Trimble were unlikely to want to strike down the New York 
law.344 Blackmun wrote wryly: “In this modern day, illegitimacy is of no 
significance, apparently, and the popular thing would be to reverse.”345 
Blackmun wanted to uphold the law, though he “would not do so alone if all 
the [other Trimble dissenters] give way.”346 
To Blackmun’s surprise, however, Powell voted to uphold the New York 
law, believing that Trimble was distinguishable.347 The remaining members of 
the Trimble majority adhered to their earlier position.348 As in Trimble, 
Powell’s was the deciding vote in Lalli and Burger assigned him the opinion. 
Powell framed the statute as concerned not with marital status or legitimacy, 
but merely with the establishment of paternity to ensure the “just and orderly 
disposition of property at death,” which was an “interest of considerable 
magnitude.”349 Unlike the statute in Trimble, New York’s law did not 
absolutely bar illegitimate children from inheritance.350 
Even if Lalli had come out the other way, the case seemed a flawed 
vehicle for a sex discrimination ruling. As several clerks observed, Robert 
Lalli’s mother was no longer alive, much less a party to the case.351 The clerks 
also doubted whether any sex discrimination claim had been raised below, 
though Jane Greengold Stevens had coauthored an amicus brief making sex 
equality arguments to the high Court.352 Clerk Eric Anderson recommended to 
Powell “that the Court not get into the sex discrimination issues,” and Powell 
 
 344. Memorandum, Justice Blackmun, No. 77-1115, Lalli v. Lalli, at 9, collected in Blackmun 
Papers, Box 283, Folder 9. 
 345. Id. at 10. 
 346. Id. 
 347. Justice Stevens disagreed, writing to Powell of “not wanting to retreat from the Court’s 
fine opinion in Trimble.” Letter from Justice Stevens to Justice Powell, No. 77-1115, Lalli v. Lalli 
(Nov. 14, 1978), collected in Powell papers. 
 348. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 275–77 (1978) (Stewart, J. concurring). 
 349. Id. at 268 (Powell, J.). Burger asked Powell to call it “an interest of the highest order.” 
Letter from Chief Justice Burger to Justice Powell, No. 77-1115, Lalli v. Lalli (Nov. 30, 1978), 
collected in Powell Papers. 
 350. Blackmun’s brief concurring opinion called Trimble a “derelict,” a characterization that 
Stewart’s concurrence disputed. Id. at 277 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The dissenters worried that 
requiring an official paternity determination penalized children of fathers who voluntarily supported 
them, thus obviating the need for a formal order of filiation. Id. at 278 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 351. Bench Memorandum from Gary Sasso to Justice White, collected in White Papers, Box 
436, Folder 5; Preliminary Memorandum from Michael Sundermeyer, No. 77-1115-ASX, Lalli v. 
Lalli (Mar. 6, 1978), at 5, collected in Blackmun Papers, Box 283, Folder 9 (noting that “A DWSFQ 
w[oul]d be consistent with your votes in Trimble and Labine”); Bench Memorandum from Eric 
Anderson to Justice Powell, No. 77-1115, Lalli v. Lalli (Sept. 29, 1978), collected in Powell Papers. 
The party opposing Robert Lalli’s inheritance was Mario’s legal widow, Rosamond Lalli. Lalli, 439 
U.S. at 261. 
 352. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Legal Aid Society of New York City and Legal Services 
of the Elderly Poor in Support of Appellant at 22–28, Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (No. 77-1115). 
2015] THE NONMARITAL FAMILY 1333 
agreed.353 As the last in the line of intestacy cases that came before the Court in 
the 1970s, Lalli seemed at best an emblem of the Justices’ vacillation, at worst, 
a retreat from the principles that had intermittently animated the illegitimacy 
cases. 
3. “Neither Illogical Nor Unjust”: Parham v. Hughes, 1979 
“Sex discrimination issues” could not be avoided in Parham v. Hughes.354 
When a tragic automobile accident killed six-year-old Lemuel Parham and his 
mother, Cassandra Moreen, his father Curtis Parham did as Minnie Brade 
Glona had done a decade earlier: sued for his son’s wrongful death.355 Parham 
did not live with Lemuel and his mother, but he was deeply involved in the 
boy’s life, providing financial support, visiting him daily, and taking care of 
Lemuel at home on many weekends.356 Under Georgia law, a mother could sue 
for the wrongful death of a nonmarital child regardless of his legitimacy. 
Fathers, in contrast, were required to have legitimated their children in order to 
file such an action.357 Parham had signed his son’s birth certificate but had not 
completed the required legitimation paperwork.358 The Georgia Supreme Court 
upheld the statutory exclusion against his due process and equal protection 
challenge, distinguishing Glona.359 
By the time Parham reached the Supreme Court, some observers 
despaired of discerning a consistent pattern in the Justices’ treatment of 
illegitimacy-based classifications. Clerk Albert Lauber wrote to Blackmun: 
“Quite frankly, I must confess that trying to reconcile all these cases is the most 
difficult task I have faced in my tenure as a law clerk.”360 Blackmun’s own 
votes were a mixed bag; Powell, too, appeared to vacillate. Powell had written 
florid opinions striking down illegitimacy penalties as inimical to the principle 
that “hapless” children should not suffer for their parents’ “irresponsible 
liaisons”;361 he had also authored and joined relatively bloodless decisions 
upholding illegitimacy classifications as rationally related to legitimate 
 
 353. Bench Memorandum from Eric Anderson to Justice Powell, No. 77-1115, Lalli v. Lalli 
(Sept. 29, 1978), collected in Powell Papers. Next to this sentence in Anderson’s bench memo, Powell 
wrote, “Yes.” Id. at 8. 
 354. 441 U.S. 347 (1979). 
 355. Parham v. Hughes, No. 5643-C (Ga. Super. Ct. Cnty. Richmond Sep. 13, 1977), reprinted 
in Appendix at 3, Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (No. 78-3); see also Parham, 441 U.S. at 349. 
 356. Parham v. Hughes, No. 5643-C (Ga. Super. Ct. Cnty. Richmond Sep. 13, 1977), reprinted 
in Appendix at 3, Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (No. 78-3). 
 357. Parham, 441 U.S. at 348–49. 
 358. Id. at 349. 
 359. Hughes v. Parham, 243 S.E.2d 867, 871 (Ga. 1978), aff’d, 441 U.S. 347 (1979). 
 360. Preliminary Memorandum from Albert G. Lauber to Justice Blackmun, Parham v. 
Hughes, No. 78-3 (Mar. 1, 1979), collected in Blackmun Papers, Box 291, Folder 2. 
 361. See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175–76 (1972). 
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government interests in preventing fraudulent and spurious claims of 
paternity.362  
Framing Parham as primarily a sex discrimination case provided one way 
to avoid this morass. At conference, Brennan and Marshall, reliable votes for 
illegitimacy plaintiffs, took this approach, and White agreed. Blackmun 
remained ambivalent; he drafted and considered filing a separate dissent in 
Parham attempting to make sense of his (and the Court’s) seemingly 
contradictory positions in illegitimacy cases.363 After writing several agonized 
memos on the subject, clerk Lauber concluded that the best way to reconcile 
Blackmun’s votes in the illegitimacy cases was to say that he “ha[d] much 
more difficulty with gender-based classifications than with illegitimacy-based 
classifications.”364 
In the end, though, Stewart’s plurality opinion sidestepped both the 
illegitimacy and the sex discrimination questions presented by Parham. The 
challenged law, he declared, simply did not reflect “invidious discrimination” 
and therefore warranted no special scrutiny.365 Parham epitomized the 
underside of the child-centered account of illegitimacy penalties’ harm: quoting 
the familiar “hapless and innocent children” passage from Weber, Stewart 
wrote that the “basic rationale” of the illegitimacy decisions was that it was 
“unjust and ineffective for society to express its condemnation of procreation 
outside the marital relationship by punishing the illegitimate child who is in no 
way responsible for his situation and is unable to change it.”366 In contrast, he 
declared, it was “neither illogical nor unjust for society to express its 
‘condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage’ by not 
conferring upon a biological father the statutory right to sue for the wrongful 
death of his illegitimate child.”367 When a statute affected the rights of fathers 
 
 362. Sometimes on the same day, as in Trimble and Fiallo, and in Parham and Caban v. 
Mohammed. Compare Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (Powell, J.) (striking down Illinois 
intestacy law excluding illegitimate children from paternal inheritance on April 26, 1977), with Fiallo 
v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (Powell, J.) (upholding immigration laws classifying based on sex and 
illegitimacy on April 26, 1977); compare Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (Powell, J.) 
(invalidating stepfather adoption where biological father had lived with and raised “illegitimate” 
children on April 24, 1979), with Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979) (Stewart, J.) (upholding 
Georgia wrongful death law precluding nonmarital fathers from recovering in the absence of 
“legitimation” on April 24, 1979). Some of the Justices were relatively consistent in their votes, with 
Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall always supporting the plaintiffs, and Rehnquist a reliable vote for the 
defendants. Burger and Stewart had voted for the plaintiffs in some of the early cases, but beginning in 
1976, they always sided with defendants. 
 363. Various versions of his draft dissent, never filed, suggested that Blackmun had 
distinguished between three categories of cases—inheritance, non-inheritance, and federal welfare 
statutes. Draft dissent, Parham v. Hughes (No. 78-3), collected in Blackmun Papers, Box 291, Folder 
2. 
 364. Preliminary Memorandum from Albert G. Lauber to Justice Blackmun, Parham v. 
Hughes, No. 78-3 (Mar. 1, 1979), collected in Blackmun Papers, Box 291, Folder 2. 
 365. Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 355 (1979). 
 366. Id. at 352 (emphasis added). 
 367. Id. at 353. 
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only, “[t]he justifications for judicial sensitivity to the constitutionality of 
differing legislative treatment of legitimate and illegitimate children are simply 
absent.”368 As for the alleged sex discrimination, Stewart interpreted the 
Court’s earlier cases as applying only to circumstances in which men and 
women were “similarly situated.”369 Here, he insisted, they were not: under 
Georgia law, only a father could unilaterally legitimate a child. Moreover, 
whereas unmarried mothers were easily identifiable, fathers’ identity “will 
frequently be unknown.”370 
Powell provided a fifth vote to uphold the Georgia statute, though he 
concurred separately.371 Justice White, whose opinion in Stanley v. 
Illinois several years earlier had ushered in a new era of limited parental rights 
for nonmarital fathers, wrote a strongly worded dissent condemning the 
plurality’s failure to see the constitutional harm suffered by Curtis Parham. 
“What we said in Glona about unmarried mothers,” White insisted, “applies 
equally to unmarried fathers.”372 Of course, the significance of what the Court 
said in Glona about unmarried mothers was deeply contested and far from 
clear.373 In any event, the Parham plurality opinion strongly suggested that 
little more than a decade later, many Justices interpreted Glona narrowly 
indeed. 
4. “High Court Rules Against Unwed Mothers”: Califano v. Boles, 1979 
At the decade’s close, an unsuccessful constitutional challenge to the 
exclusion of unwed parents from “mothers’ insurance” benefits starkly 
spotlighted the limitations of illegitimacy jurisprudence’s challenge to marital 
supremacy and sex inequality. Margaret Gonzales and Norman W. Boles lived 
together unmarried in Georgetown, Texas, between 1963 and 1966.374 Their 
son, Norman J. Boles, was born in 1964.375 In 1967, Norman Sr. returned to 
Tennessee and married a woman who bore him two sons.376 When Norman Sr. 
died in 1971, all three of the Boles children received children’s insurance 
benefits, but Gonzales’s application for mothers’ insurance benefits was 
denied.377 Only Nancy Boles, Norman’s legal widow, was eligible for mothers’ 
benefits under the Social Security Act.378 With the help of Texas Legal Aid 
lawyers and attorneys from the Center for Law and Social Policy (CLASP) in 
 
 368. Id. 
 369. Id. at 354. 
 370. Id. at 355. 
 371. Powell’s concurrence upheld the statute’s sex-based classification under the intermediate 
scrutiny standard. Id. at 359 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 372. Id. at 363 (White, J., dissenting). 
 373. See supra notes 92–103 and accompanying text. 
 374. Boles v. Califano, 464 F. Supp. 408, 410 (W.D. Tex. 1978). 
    375. Id. 
 376. Id. 
 377. Id. 
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Washington, D.C., Gonzales and Norman Jr. filed a class action lawsuit in 
1974 on behalf of all similarly situated unmarried mothers and nonmarital 
children.379 The plaintiffs’ attorney in the Supreme Court, Herbert Semmel of 
CLASP, had long eyed this statutory exclusion: in 1969, he had suggested that 
Glona might be read to invalidate it.380 
When the Boles litigation began, only mothers married to wage earners 
were eligible for so-called “mothers’ insurance” benefits when a father died.381 
In 1975, the Supreme Court ruled in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld that excluding 
widowed fathers from these benefits violated equal protection.382 For the Boles 
plaintiffs in particular, Wiesenfeld seemed like a godsend. Litigants and judges 
alike agreed that the determinative question was whether the primary intended 
beneficiaries of the mothers’ insurance program were mothers themselves or 
their children. If the provision was aimed at children, then excluding mothers 
who had never married the wage-earning father seemed like unconstitutional 
discrimination against illegitimate children, plain and simple. 
The Boles plaintiffs argued that children were the primary intended 
beneficiaries, and federal district court Judge Jack Roberts agreed. Roberts 
found that “Mother’s Benefits are not related to an obligation to support the 
mother but rather stem from the statutory purpose to assist the children” by 
“allow[ing] the surviving child of a deceased worker to receive the care of its 
surviving parent, relieving at least to some extent the necessity of the surviving 
parent to leave the child and go to work.”383 Roberts granted summary 
judgment to the plaintiffs, calling the mothers’ benefit exclusion “the classic 
case of visiting the sins of the parents on the child.”384 
If mothers’ benefits truly were children’s benefits by another name, Boles 
was an easy case. But if, as the federal government maintained, mothers—
parents, after Wiesenfeld—were the intended beneficiaries, matters became 
 
 379. See id. 
 380. See Semmel, supra note 88, at 300 (“Approached from the perspective of the mother of an 
illegitimate, Glona can be read to assert that a mother cannot be denied a benefit based on a 
relationship to her illegitimate child which is afforded mothers of legitimates. . . . The class of persons 
receiving benefits are mothers of the deceased children and Congress may not constitutionally 
discriminate within such a class solely on the basis of whether the mother ever entered into a formal 
marriage with the father.”). 
 381. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (extending the benefit to fathers). 
 382. The decision in Wiesenfeld, see supra note 277 and accompanying text, provided a 
promising precedent for sex-discriminatory illegitimacy classifications like those challenged in the 
intestacy cases, because it invalidated discrimination against children based on the sex of their 
surviving parent. The child-centered language of Wiesenfeld also seemed a boon to illegitimacy 
plaintiffs generally. See 420 U.S. at 652. 
 383. Boles v. Califano, 464 F. Supp. 408, 411 (W.D. Tex. 1978), rev’d, 443 U.S. 282 (1979). 
The Social Security Act had, until 1965, excluded illegitimate children from all benefits. Thereafter, 
Roberts wrote, “Congress included illegitimate children but hedged their benefits with a series of 
discriminatory provisions,” most of which the Supreme Court had already deemed unconstitutional by 
the late 1970s. Id. at 417. 
 384. Id. at 413. 
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much more complicated. The government argued that Congress had merely 
used marriage as a proxy for economic dependence, intending to replace 
support lost upon a wage-earner’s death.385 It was perfectly reasonable to 
assume that unmarried mothers were “significantly less likely to have been 
dependent on the wage-earner.”386 Indeed, the government pointed out, if an 
unmarried father “did not choose voluntarily to support the unmarried mother, 
in most states she had no legal recourse to compel him to do so.”387 As 
Assistant Solicitor General Harriet Shapiro388 told the Court, “The theory 
behind mothers’ benefits is that a wife with an entitled child in her care should 
have the same option that she had before her husband’s death. That is, either to 
stay home, supported by her husband to take care of the children, or else to 
work and help to support the family.”389 The vast majority of never-married 
mothers had never had such a choice—at least not by virtue of marriage to their 
children’s father. 
The Court had made clear in earlier Social Security cases that the 
government could not use parental marital status—illegitimacy—as a proxy for 
a child’s dependency or lack thereof.390 In other words, an illegitimate child 
could not be denied benefits outright on the assumption that she did not depend 
upon her parent for support; at the very least, the child must be afforded the 
opportunity to prove dependency. But in a series of cases decided in the mid-
1970s, the Court held that for adults, marriage could be used as a shorthand for 
dependency. In 1976, the Court unanimously held that Congress could cut off 
disability benefits to an individual who married someone ineligible for such 
benefits, because the government could assume that a married person could 
depend upon his or her spouse for support.391 The same year, the Justices 
upheld the exclusion of divorced women under age sixty-two from certain 
Social Security benefits available to similarly situated married women, finding 
it reasonable to assume that ex-spouses were less likely to be dependent than 
married couples.392 Since marriage was a legitimate proxy for adults’ 
dependency, the government argued in Boles, restricting Social Security 
 
 385. Brief for Appellant at 10, Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282 (1979) (No. 78-808) 1979 WL 
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(1975). 
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benefits to parents who had married the family wage-earner posed no 
constitutional problem.393 
At first, it seemed as if the child-focused view of the case would prevail in 
the Supreme Court. Jack Pratt, clerk to Chief Justice Burger, wrote confidently 
in his “cert pool memo” that the district court was correct,394 and at first, a 
majority of the Justices agreed.395 But what had begun as a narrow victory for 
the plaintiffs became a five-to-four decision against them, authored by the 
Court’s foremost opponent of illegitimacy plaintiffs, Justice Rehnquist. 
Rehnquist was the only Justice with a more or less consistently 
conservative record in both sex- and illegitimacy-based discrimination cases.396 
The rare exception was Wiesenfeld, where—ironically—Rehnquist had 
concurred separately to underscore his belief that the “only purpose of [the 
mother’s insurance program] is to make it possible for children of deceased 
contributing workers to have the personal care and attention of the surviving 
parent.”397 In Boles, Rehnquist did an about-face. His majority opinion 
accepted the government’s view that the “benefit to a child as a result of the 
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dissolution . . . .” 411 U.S. at 622 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Whereas in earlier illegitimacy cases, “a 
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 397. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 655 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) 
(emphasis added). 
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parent or guardian’s receipt of mother’s insurance benefits” was merely 
“incidental.”398 
Blackmun clerk Bill McDaniel reacted indignantly to Rehnquist’s first 
draft. Rehnquist had tried to undercut Wiesenfeld’s impact on sex equality law 
by focusing on children, and now, “his position has come back to haunt 
him.”399 In order “to avoid a result that would benefit illegitimates,” McDaniel 
wrote, “he now retreats from his former avowed position. I do not find this 
convincing,” the clerk fumed. “I do find it unseemly.”400 
Justice Marshall’s dissent, too, excoriated Rehnquist’s—and the 
Court’s—reinterpretation of statutory purpose. Moreover, his opinion, joined 
by Brennan, Blackmun, and White, disputed the majority’s view that the 
“discriminatory impact on illegitimates” did not pose any constitutional 
problem. In past cases, the fact that illegitimate children were not wholly 
excluded from benefits had not stopped the Court from finding an equal 
protection violation. Marshall lamented the Court’s “imprimatur” for a 
distinction “needlessly predicated on a disfavored social status” that was 
“beyond an individual’s power to affect.”401 
Notably, though, despite their vehement disagreement over the proper 
resolution of the case, the Boles litigants and Justices all agreed that victory for 
the plaintiffs hinged upon reading the mother’s insurance program as primarily 
benefiting children, rather than parents. None of the court documents so much 
as suggested that unmarried mothers themselves might have a constitutional 
claim against exclusion from the statutory scheme. 
In some ways, this elision is unsurprising. After all, the Court had recently 
held that marriage was a constitutionally legitimate proxy for dependency.402 
But none of the earlier cases implicated a distinction between married and 
never-married mothers. The previous Social Security cases, Jimenez and Lucas, 
had not made sex discrimination arguments either, but such arguments had 
become common in the most recent cases concerning intestacy and 
employment discrimination against unmarried mothers. Boles did not clearly 
implicate a purely sex-based classification, since married mothers received 
benefits, but other cases had framed discrimination against unwed mothers as 
sex discrimination.403 Privacy and liberty arguments were available as well: a 
student note published shortly after the Boles decision suggested that the 
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challenged statute unconstitutionally infringed upon mothers’ “fundamental 
right” to choose not to marry.404 
By the late 1970s, influential feminists and constitutional scholars had 
highlighted the connection between “illegitimacy,” reproductive freedom, and 
sex equality.405 Certainly, the Boles statute’s detrimental impact on unmarried 
mothers was no mystery. The Washington Post headline after the Boles 
decision proclaimed, “High Court Rules, 5 to 4, Against Unwed Mothers.”406 
As Social Security manager Richard Hyde put it: 
We read that couples living together outside of marriage is a growing 
trend. Maybe it’s all part of the woman’s liberation and equal rights 
movements. But one must wonder if a girl considering such an 
arrangement ever thinks about the absence of equal risks—the risks all 
seem to be on her side. If you don’t believe this—ask Margaret 
Gonzales.407 
III. 
ILLEGITIMACY, INEQUALITY, AND THE LEGACIES OF MARITAL SUPREMACY 
The illegitimacy cases changed the law in important ways. Whatever the 
limitations of the Court’s reasoning, the act of striking down most distinctions 
between “legitimate” and “illegitimate” children meant that many nonmarital 
families enjoyed greater protection from legal disabilities such as children’s 
inability to inherit or obtain child support from fathers, and that nonmarital 
children received government benefits from which they had long been 
excluded. By extension, these rule changes benefited (some) parents of 
nonmarital children and made the world safer for nonmarital sex and 
childbearing, even if their underlying rhetoric and rationale were less 
progressive than they might have been. 
These changes occurred against a backdrop of political tumult that 
provided both opportunities and constraints for opponents of illegitimacy 
penalties. In the mid- to late-1960s, anti-poverty and civil rights lawyers seized 
the opening offered by the Warren Court’s civil rights jurisprudence to make 
race and wealth equality arguments against laws that disadvantaged nonmarital 
families. The political obstacles to normalizing nonmarital sex, childbearing, 
and family formation were formidable even—or perhaps especially—in the 
heyday of Great Society liberalism. For many liberals and civil rights leaders, 
“illegitimacy” remained a scourge, threatening to sabotage racial progress by 
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undermining the male breadwinner ideal and contributing to the “tangle of 
pathology” inherent in “matriarchal” family structure.408 For conservatives and 
many Southern “moderates,” moral regulations, including illegitimacy 
penalties, had become a convenient way to resist desegregation and shore up 
racial hierarchy after the demise of de jure racial discrimination.409 
By the early 1970s, feminists and their allies could capitalize on the 
women’s movement’s increasing political salience and on emerging sex 
equality precedents to highlight the distinctive harms illegitimacy penalties 
imposed on women. Soon after feminists unseated “breadwinner liberalism” as 
the reigning ideology undergirding progressive social policy, however, the 
ascendancy of a countermovement committed to “breadwinner conservatism” 
reconfigured the old constraints.410 Nixon’s Court appointments replaced two 
liberals on illegitimacy cases (Warren and Fortas) and two dissenters from 
Levy/Glona (Harlan and Black) with two conservatives (Burger and Rehnquist) 
and two swing voters (Powell and Blackmun). Feminists became entrenched in 
an unexpectedly lengthy and unsuccessful battle over the Equal Rights 
Amendment (ERA); though they achieved significant change through the 
courts, their efforts ran aground precisely in areas most salient to reproduction 
and the primacy of marital families.411 
For understandable reasons, then, advocates did not deploy the full arsenal 
of feminist challenges to illegitimacy penalties in court. They did not, for 
instance, directly question the privatization of dependency within the nuclear 
family. Even Andrews, which celebrated women’s economic autonomy from 
men, depicted the plaintiffs as engaged in an admirable quest for independence 
from public assistance, for self-sufficiency through market work. Advocates in 
the other illegitimacy cases often mentioned the irrationality of neglecting 
available private sources of support and thus increasing public welfare 
expenditures. 
It is also true that no feminist organization prioritized the illegitimacy 
cases or launched a concerted campaign on behalf of unmarried mothers in 
particular.412 Many aspects of feminists’ legal agenda during this period 
 
 408. See Mayeri, supra note 26, and sources on the Moynihan Report cited therein; see also 
MOYNIHAN, supra note 26, at 8–9, 29–37. 
 409. See generally WALKER, THE GHOST OF JIM CROW, supra note 29. See also supra Part II. 
 410. I borrow these terms from Robert O. Self’s compelling synthetic history of this period, 
ALL IN THE FAMILY: THE REALIGNMENT OF AMERICAN POLITICS SINCE THE 1960S (2012). 
 411. See Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict, and Constitutional 
Change: The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323 (2006). On the achievements and 
limits of feminist legal advocacy in the 1970s, see MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE, supra note 12. 
 412. Feminist organizations’ involvement in the cases discussed here was not insignificant. 
Ginsburg attempted to persuade her colleagues to allow the ACLU WRP to file an amicus brief in 
Fiallo v. Bell, see supra notes 323–329 and accompanying text. The WRP also reviewed Frank 
Cochran’s early submissions in Roe v. Norton. See Supplement to Jurisdictional Statement, Roe v. 
Norton, 422 U.S. 391 (1974) (No. 73-6033), collected in ACLU Records, Mudd Library, Princeton 
University, Box 2833, Folder: Roe v. Norton; Memorandum including Frank Cochran’s proposed 
1342 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  5:1277 
encompassed women regardless of marital status: reproductive freedom, the 
campaign against employment discrimination generally, and pregnancy 
discrimination in particular, to name a few. In part, the failure to foreground 
illegitimacy penalties likely reflected ambivalence among some feminist 
strategists about the wisdom of placing unwed parents at the center of feminist 
litigation campaigns. Attacking male supremacy within marriage—which 
loomed large on the agenda of leading feminist legal advocates413—posed a 
fairly radical challenge to American law and social life. Challenging marital 
supremacy in a political environment where feminists stood accused by ERA 
opponents of assaulting traditional marriage and family relationships likely 
seemed impolitic.414 Courtroom advocates in particular were acutely aware of 
their audience and of the generational norms that made even otherwise liberal 
judges like Justice Brennan balk at much tamer feminist claims about the 
normative ideals of family life.415 
Communities in which nonmarital childbearing was prevalent were 
themselves divided over the wisdom of fighting for “unwed mothers’” rights: 
Katie Mae Andrews’s lawyer, Charles Victor McTeer, for instance, recalls 
sharp divisions within Drew, Mississippi’s, African American community over 
her case.416 Andrews and her co-plaintiff Lestine Rogers presented themselves 
as responsible, religious women who had made a mistake born of ignorance 
and lack of access to contraception, not as champions of sexual liberty or 
flouters of marriage.417 The testimony in Andrews revealed some dissension 
about the moral valence of nonmarital sex, however. When questioned about 
how she would counsel a student who asked whether she should engage in 
sexual intercourse, teacher’s aide applicant Viola Burnett replied that she saw 
no harm in it, and would advise her pupils to do as they pleased.418 
Philadelphia activist and plaintiff Lois Fernandez owned her decision to 
become a single mother as a choice she made with pride and without regrets.419 
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The illegitimacy cases were not the product of a concerted or centralized 
litigation campaign. Though some advocates and organizations became 
interested and involved in multiple cases, their participation tended to occur 
more by happenstance than by design. Moreover, counsel and allies of 
illegitimacy plaintiffs ran the ideological gamut from Moynihanian reformers 
such as Harry Krause,420 to civil libertarians like Norman Dorsen and his 
protégés,421 to legal aid lawyers like Jane Greengold Stevens,422 to activists 
primarily motivated by feminism—even fairly radical feminism, at least by the 
standards of 1970s feminist lawyering.423 
Even the more progressive civil libertarians and feminists moderated their 
most innovative arguments in court. The challenge posed by the illegitimacy 
cases to marital supremacy was significantly more limited than the broadest 
feminist attacks on illegitimacy penalties articulated by young activists such as 
Wallach and Tenoso. Advocates understandably hesitated to question directly 
the states’ prerogative to promote traditional family relationships, or to deter 
illicit sexual behavior, especially when doing so was unnecessary—and 
perhaps counterproductive—to overturning discriminatory laws. They never 
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argued in court that women (or men) had a constitutional right to engage in 
nonmarital sex, though notably, they did contend that women’s reproductive 
autonomy should include the right to bear nonmarital children as well as the 
prerogative to terminate a pregnancy.424 Notwithstanding these limitations, 
imposed under considerable political constraints, courtroom advocates 
advanced a much more capacious account of what was wrong with illegitimacy 
penalties than judicial opinions ever made visible. 
Despite their efforts, by the end of the 1970s, the child-focused view of 
illegitimacy’s harm had prevailed. Adults could be sanctioned for immorality, 
but innocent children should not suffer needlessly for their parents’ 
transgressions. Marriage alone could be a proxy for adults’ dependency, even 
when it would no longer suffice as a measure of children’s needs. Courts 
scrutinized the relationship between means and ends, but ultimately upheld the 
government’s interest in discouraging nonmarital sex, cohabitation or 
childbearing, and in encouraging marriage and legitimate family 
relationships.425 Marital supremacy remained alive and well, and the formal sex 
neutrality now required for married couples did not extend to nonmarital 
partners or unmarried parents. Further, illegitimacy jurisprudence conveyed the 
impression that sex, race, and illegitimacy were separate, non-overlapping 
categories—suitable for purposes of (often unfavorable) comparison but not for 
illuminating their mutually reinforcing and deeply intertwined character. 
Why did arguments against sex inequality and marital supremacy make so 
little headway in the illegitimacy cases? One reason was inauspicious timing in 
a changing political environment. The early entrenchment of the child-focused 
approach in the years before feminist legal advocates began to win 
constitutional cases in the Supreme Court and the Court’s increasingly 
conservative composition in the years thereafter meant that the Justices’ 
collective appetite for liberal innovations declined just as feminist momentum 
accelerated. Advocates such as Norman Dorsen and Sylvia Law later became 
champions of sex equality, but even had they been inclined to make such 
arguments when they strategized about the first illegitimacy cases in 1967, they 
would have had little doctrinal ammunition.426 Even Weber preceded the 
Court’s first deep consideration of sex equality under the equal protection 
clause in Frontiero v. Richardson by several months, and Justices Powell and 
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Rehnquist joined the Court too late to take part in Stanley v. Illinois or Reed v. 
Reed.427 Moreover, the Court’s personnel changes, underwritten by electoral 
and cultural shifts, meant that the outcomes in 1970s illegitimacy cases would 
largely be determined by swing Justices Powell, Blackmun, and Stewart. 
Procedural obstacles with substantive subtexts also plagued illegitimacy 
plaintiffs. In Linda R.S., the challenge to a criminal non-support law that 
exempted nonmarital fathers from liability, the Supreme Court ultimately 
agreed with the federal district court majority’s holding that a mother and her 
child lacked standing to challenge the state’s failure to prosecute unmarried 
fathers.428 In Gomez, the challenge to a similar exemption in Texas’s civil child 
support law, Powell clerk William Kelly noted that there was “a sex 
discrimination argument buried in this case . . . the mother but not the father 
has a duty of support.”429 But because it was not clear whether the Texas 
statute explicitly required mothers to support their illegitimate children, Kelly 
thought the sex discrimination claim was “not squarely presented.”430 
Indeed, skeptics often wondered whether sex discrimination claims were 
properly before the Court in cases involving illegitimacy-based classifications. 
These qualms reflected more than just procedural objections. In Trimble, for 
instance, Blackmun privately thought the sex discrimination claim “pretty far-
fetched. Illegitimate children, male and female, are treated alike. That is where 
the focus should be rather than on the parents.”431 Moreover, Blackmun wrote 
in an internal memo, “the classification between the mother and the father is a 
legitimate one, according to our cases, for motherhood is exposed to public 
view, whereas paternity of illegitimates is often a subject of spurious claims 
and is difficult to prove.”432 
Blackmun also called the argument that mandatory paternity disclosure 
involved a sex-based classification subject to heightened equal protection 
scrutiny “spurious.”433 Reflecting privately on Roe v. Norton, he wrote: “An 
action to establish paternity must be brought by a woman, and that 
classification cannot be avoided.”434 He saw the classification as similar to the 
one the Court had upheld in Geduldig v. Aiello (1974), where a majority of 
Justices refused to characterize the exclusion of pregnancy from a California 
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disability insurance scheme as sex discriminatory.435 Nor did Blackmun, or his 
clerk, Moynihan protégé Richard Blumenthal, buy the plaintiffs’ argument that 
reticent mothers had their children’s best interests at heart.436 
Notably, some judges did recognize the discriminatory impact of 
illegitimacy penalties on women even before the Court decided its first 
constitutional sex equality case. For instance, Texas state appellate Judge 
Carlos Cadena, an accomplished civil rights attorney and scholar, wrote a 
scathing dissent from his court’s decision in Gomez.437 A legal pioneer and 
founding member of the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education 
Fund, Cadena and his co-counsel had successfully argued the landmark case 
Hernandez v. Texas (1954), which established that the Equal Protection Clause 
protected not only African Americans but also other subordinated groups such 
as Mexican Americans.438 Cadena, the youngest of seven children of Mexican 
immigrants, also knew something about the hardships of single motherhood. 
Cadena’s parents separated when he was a child. His father returned to Mexico, 
and his mother, who supported the family as a housekeeper and laundress, 
conditioned her consent to a divorce on his pledge to pay for Carlos to attend 
college.439 Cadena later married a military widow with eight children, whom 
they raised alongside one of his own.440 
In an opinion both scholarly and colorful,441 Cadena ridiculed the notion 
that refusing to hold unwed fathers responsible would serve the government 
purpose of deterring illegitimacy. It could not, Cadena wrote, “be seriously 
contended that the governmental purpose of promoting marriage and 
discouraging sexual promiscuity is promoted by a rule which guarantees to the 
rake immunity from liability for the support of the children born as a result of 
his extramarital copulative performances.”442 Nor was the cause of “family 
unity” served by a law that exempted not only men with legitimate spouses and 
children from support liability, but also unattached men. Beside, Cadena 
remarked, it was “strange that the state shows no concern whatever for the 
stability of the legitimate family of the illegitimate mother, on whom the State 
of Texas places the obligation of support.”443 
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In a footnote, Cadena posed a rhetorical question that Gomez’s lawyers 
would pick up in their briefs to the U.S. Supreme Court: “May the illegitimate 
mother complain that she is denied the equal protection of the laws because her 
obligation[s] to her illegitimate child are substantially greater than those 
imposed upon the man who was her partner in the socially disapproved 
procreative act?”444 Cadena’s Gomez dissent thus belies the notion that sex 
equality arguments were unavailable or inaccessible to judges before the mid-
1970s, or that they were too difficult to see in cases apparently involving 
illegitimacy rather than sex classifications. 
To be sure, some cases presented mothers’ sex equality, privacy, and 
reproductive autonomy claims more centrally than others. Cases involving 
employment bans (Andrews), mandatory paternity disclosure (Norton), and 
clear, facial sex-based classifications (Andrews, Fernandez) probably provided 
the best opportunities for successful feminist arguments given their obvious 
impact on women. None of these cases produced a Supreme Court opinion, 
though Norton and Andrews were fully briefed and argued. The Justices at the 
Court’s ideological center seemed relieved to avoid the thorny constitutional 
questions these cases raised.445 After the Court successfully dodged the sex 
equality/illegitimacy nexus in Andrews and Trimble, the decade’s remaining 
cases (Fiallo, Lalli, Boles) proved more difficult—though hardly hopeless—
vehicles for highlighting illegitimacy penalties’ burden on mothers. 
Politically, child-focused arguments always had an edge over expansive 
visions of sexual freedom, race and sex equality, and even privacy. One could 
believe fervently in the sanctity of marriage and the traditional family, in the 
immorality of nonmarital sex, and in the inviolability of privatized dependence 
and nevertheless recoil at laws that punished “hapless and innocent” children 
for circumstances utterly beyond their control. As the Court and the nation’s 
political climate drifted to the right, consensus on issues of morality and 
equality became ever more elusive. A focus on children allowed advocates and 
courts to sidestep these thornier issues and unite behind the banner of 
children’s welfare.446 
Appeals to children’s well being also conveniently underwrote more 
pecuniary motivations. Support and inheritance rights for nonmarital children 
helped to privatize their dependency, as did allowing them to receive workers’ 
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compensation and to recover for the wrongful death of their parents.447 Making 
illegitimate children eligible for Social Security benefits eased the welfare 
burden on states. Allowing unmarried mothers access to decent jobs saved on 
public assistance costs. Privileging marriage, in other words, did not always 
serve the cause of privatizing dependency.448 And as these examples reflect, 
most illegitimacy penalties could easily be framed as injurious to both women 
and children. Mandatory paternity disclosure, by contrast, apparently pitted 
mothers’ desire for privacy and autonomy against children’s right to a father’s 
support and care. This supposed conflict motivated advocates to expose how 
child-centered rationales obscured baser purposes: they accused supporters of 
mandatory paternity disclosure of concealing “fiscal concerns” beneath a patina 
of solicitude for children’s welfare.449 
Advocates had a larger arsenal of constitutional weapons at their disposal 
by the mid-1970s. But the emerging jurisprudence of sex equality, sexual 
privacy, and parental rights had its limitations. Many of the equal protection 
cases won by feminists in the 1970s established the right of married couples to 
pursue more egalitarian divisions of household and market labor, free of 
government-imposed sex stereotypes.450 Husbands and wives could no longer 
be assumed by law to fall naturally into breadwinning and 
caregiving/dependent roles. But many of the government benefits now 
available to widowers as well as widows, marital families where wives were 
primary breadwinners, and surviving fathers as well as mothers, remained 
wholly unavailable to unmarried parents. The Court severely limited the 
definition of sex discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, exempting 
discrimination based on pregnancy from constitutional censure and upholding 
sex-based distinctions based on “real” differences.451 And crucially, by the end 
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of the 1970s, a policy’s disparate impact on a disadvantaged group carried little 
weight without proof of discriminatory intent.452 
The reasoning, if not the result, of the sexual privacy cases, too, fell short 
of feminist ideals.453 Apart from the well-known failure of Roe v. Wade to rely 
on sex equality grounds for abortion rights, and Justice Douglas’s paean to the 
“sanctity of the marital bedroom” in Griswold, these cases subtly reaffirmed 
marital supremacy in other ways. Some supporters of decriminalizing 
contraception for unmarried couples argued to the Court in Eisenstadt that the 
tragic costs of “illegitimacy” could thus be avoided.454 Roe v. Wade referred to 
the “continuing stigma of unwed motherhood” as a justification for allowing 
women to “consider” abortion “in consultation” with a “responsible 
physician.”455 Virtually no one even hinted, in any of these cases, that the state 
could not constitutionally prohibit fornication. And the “unwed fathers” cases 
tread cautiously in questioning the state’s ability to privilege marriage or to 
distinguish between unmarried parents on the basis of sex.456 Indeed, the 
specter of equal rights for unmarried mothers and fathers cast a long shadow 
over challenges to sex discrimination and marital supremacy in the 1970s and 
beyond.457 
The Court’s rulings legalizing abortion and contraception yielded 
important material advances in both liberty and equality, making nonmarital 
sex less costly and allowing women greater economic and social as well as 
sexual autonomy. When plaintiffs prevailed, the illegitimacy cases also 
improved lives, granting access to benefits for “illegitimate” children that 
assisted nonmarital children and, by extension, those responsible for their 
support. But reasoning as well as results mattered. The Court’s reluctance to 
address the constitutional implications of illegitimacy penalties for racial, 
gender, and economic inequality, or for sexual privacy and liberty, meant that 
even favorable statutory and regulatory developments remained vulnerable to 
reversal. For instance, the failure to apply sex equality or sexual privacy and 
liberty principles to mandatory paternity disclosure laws in the 1960s and 
1970s left the door open to stringent requirements that enlisted welfare 
recipients in state efforts to identify fathers and collect child support even after 
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statutory entitlements to public assistance disappeared with the enactment of 
welfare reform in the 1990s.458 
In other areas, statutory rights never materialized, leaving marital 
privileges intact. For instance, while Congress and the courts extended to 
nonmarital children some—though not all—Social Security benefits available 
to legitimate children, unmarried parents never received the same courtesy. 
Spousal benefits and benefits to formerly married parents became formally sex-
neutral, and divorced spouses gained somewhat greater protection. But 
custodial parents (often mothers) who had not married their children’s wage-
earning parent (often fathers) never won the equal right to the “mothers’ 
insurance” benefits the Court extended to (married) fathers in Wiesenfeld. And, 
of course, as contemporary marriage equality advocates remind us, thousands 
of federal and state benefits follow marital status and remain unavailable to 
non-spouses.459 
The focus on harm to children elided not only sex inequality, but racial 
and economic injustice—just as nonmarital childbearing rates climbed among 
low-income families, disproportionately people of color. Failing to question the 
legal privileging of marriage as an instance of race-, gender-, and class-salient 
harm obscured the pernicious effects of marital supremacy on the very groups 
that could least afford to lose access to the benefits that accompany marriage. 
Indeed, tying social supports to conjugal partnership, marital or not, meant that 
many poor women and women of color suffered a double disadvantage because 
they lacked partners likely to be eligible for employment-related benefits. Since 
the 1970s, increasing economic inequality, high rates of incarceration, and 
chronic unemployment have intersected with divergent marriage rates to 
intensify the gap between highly educated women who could aspire to raise 
their children in gender egalitarian partnerships with affluent male peers, and 
their impoverished counterparts, who no longer could count on sharing the 
burdens of raising children in poverty with a partner, much less rely on a 
second income to escape its clutches. 
Child-focused accounts of illegitimacy penalties’ harms endure, reflecting 
marital supremacy’s resilience as well as the cross-cutting appeal of children as 
political symbols. Justice Kennedy’s concern that depriving same-sex couples 
of marital status “humiliates tens of thousands of children” is but one modern 
iteration of an idiom that family law reformers have used to various ends for at 
least two centuries.460 Many who make child-focused arguments are sincere in 
their concern for families’ welfare. Certainly, the relative success of these 
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claims in illegitimacy litigation confirms their considerable strategic 
benefits.461 But histories such as this remind us that embracing the trope of 
innocent children at the expense of non-conforming adults’ equality, freedom, 
and dignity carries a steep price—not only for adults, but for entire families.462 
CONCLUSION 
A casual reader of the illegitimacy cases could be forgiven for thinking 
that the laws they invalidated were mere relics of archaic common-law and 
Victorian approaches to sexual morality. Certainly the punishment of blameless 
children for the sins of their parents seemed “illogical and unjust” in the 
modern era. But understanding the origins of these cases in the crucible of civil 
rights activism, conservative reaction, and later, feminist advocacy, reveals 
them less as anachronistic aberrations and more as part of a larger battle over 
the relationship between family structure and racial, sexual, and economic 
justice. The more expansive arguments advocates made, in and out of court, 
about the relationship between illegitimacy penalties and other forms of 
inequality remind us that judicial opinions often mask the real stakes of legal 
and constitutional questions. If these advocates’ most capacious arguments had 
succeeded, the stakes of marriage equality might not be so high, for marriage 
might not be the exclusive path to family recognition and to social and 
economic citizenship. Marriage equality advocates might have channeled 
resources into other worthy battles without worrying that foregoing marriage 
rights would deprive LGBT families of precious dignitary and material 
benefits.463 We might today have a constitutional politics that challenges not 
only the exclusion of same-sex couples or inequities between spouses, but also 
the legal primacy of marriage itself. 
This account of lost promise should not obscure the obstacles that stood, 
and still stand, in the way of challenges to marriage’s legal primacy. True, 
marriage has ceased to be obligatory and permanent and no longer dictates sex 
and gender roles.464 But as a primary vehicle for managing and privatizing 
dependency in the absence of a robust welfare state or other social supports for 
families, marriage remains central to American political economy as well as a 
unique source of legal and cultural legitimacy. Threatening marital supremacy 
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was and is therefore perceived by many as an assault on the very foundation of 
society. Progressives, then and now, often join conservatives and traditionalists 
in policing the boundaries between marriage and non-marriage, even if they 
disagree about who should be able to marry and what roles husbands and wives 
should assume. 
Marriage equality—and gender equality within marriage—certainly need 
not come at the expense of nonmarital children and their parents. Indeed, 
marriage equality has radical and transformative, as well as conservative, 
potential.465 But the history of the illegitimacy cases suggests that focusing on 
the harm to (presumptively innocent) children while downgrading or penalizing 
their parents’ nonmarital (and presumptively not so innocent) relationships has 
destructive symbolic and material consequences for nonmarital families. 
Plaintiffs attacking illegitimacy penalties won significant victories, to be sure, 
and they made understandable strategic decisions along the way. The story told 
here makes clear, though, that winning is not everything: the terms on which 
marriage equality becomes part of our constitutional culture will help to 
determine whether same-sex couples’ access to marriage is the latest chapter in 
the history of marital supremacy or the opening salvo in a renewed battle for 
racial, sexual, and economic justice. 
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